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ACADEMIC FREEDOM AND FACULTY CAREERS:
A CASE STUDY OF 
FOUR NOBEL LAUREATE EXILES 
1930-1940 
ABSTRACT
The purpose of this historical study was to evaluate 
the consequences that the politically-determined 
conventions of academic freedom in Germany and in the 
United States had on the careers of four elite scientists 
before and after their emigration resulting from the 
threats of Nazism. This problem consisted of three 
distinct conceptual parts: (l) academic freedom, as a
concept, (2) the political conventions of academic 
freedom within pre-World War II Germany and within pre- 
and World War II America, and (3) the effect that these 
definitions had on the careers of Albert Einstein, James 
Franck, Otto Meyerhof, and Otto Stern. The methodology 
that best suited this evaluation was the historical case 
study.
In Germany, I followed academic freedom's evolution 
beginning with Humboldt's work at the University of 
Berlin, continuing through to the Weimar Republic, and
vi
concluding with the National Socialists. In the United 
States, I traced academic freedom's development from its 
classically-based roots, moving through the entrance of 
the German model, and closing with the impact of the 
American Association of University Professors.
Incumbent in this discussion was the effects that 
German nationalism, National Socialism, the Great 
Depression, communism, and anti-semitism had upon the 
evolution of academic freedom. I concluded that the 
nature and development of academic freedom was formed and 
directed by the constructs of and the constraints upon 
intellectual liberty. Its politically-determined 
conventions influenced, both positively and negatively, 
the careers of four particular scientists.
More in-depth study is necessary to further evaluate 
the relationship between various governing bodies and the 
academic freedom of the Jewish professoriate. 
Additionally, insight into the degree and manner of 
influence of university presidents upon the careers of 
faculty is also needed.
TIMOTHY DALE NORTON 
SCHOOL OF EDUCATION 
THE COLLEGE OF WILLIAM AND MARY IN VIRGINIA
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ACADEMIC FREEDOM AND FACULTY CAREERS 
A CASE STUDY OF 
FOUR NOBEL LAUREATE EXILES 
1930-1940
CHAPTER 1
ACADEMIC FREEDOM AND THE CAREERS OF FOUR INTELLECTUALS
Introduction 
It takes but one look at the inscription on the 
Statue of Liberty to be reminded that America has always 
been a place of refuge for those "tired...poor" 
individuals who, in their attempts to escape intolerance 
and oppression in foreign lands, found in this nation a 
place where they could finally "breath free." Scattered 
among the "huddled masses" fleeing Hitler's strangle-hold 
were intellectuals looking for opportunities to continue 
to pursue their careers in the country that had so 
willingly opened its "golden door" to them. This study 
evaluates the influence that academic freedom in Germany 
and the United States had on the careers of four such 
intellectuals both before and after their emigration from 
the threats of Nazism.
Understanding Academic Freedom 
In order for an institution of higher learning to 
legitimately state that academic freedom exists within 
its boundaries, the professors of that institution must
2
3be able to say that they can "pursue the truth 
unhindered" (Pincoffs 1975, viii). Although this 
definition is brief, it focuses upon the core issue of an 
educational concept that can be adulterated by the most 
innocent of attempts to clarify its various conventions.
Within the context of this inquiry, "pursuit" is 
defined as "the act of following with a view to reach, 
accomplish or obtain" (Webster, 1828). The professor who 
claims to be functioning in a free academic environment 
is intimating that he or she is involved in a process 
that has an attainable goal. The precise intention and 
ultimate expectation is the "attainment" of the goal, 
truth, that is being pursued (Searle, 1975; Metzger,
1977).
Truth, which is defined as "conformity to fact or 
reality" (Webster, 1828), is an objective for which the 
scholar labors tirelessly. Attempts, however valiant and 
well-intentioned, to articulate its parameters inevitably 
result in an acknowledgement that there are numerous 
dissimilar perceptions about as well as countless 
disparate approaches to its elusive essence (Pincoffs, 
1975; Metzger, 1977).
Finally, this "pursuit of truth" must occur in an 
"unhindered" environment, that is, one "without 
opposition" (Webster, 1828). Pincoffs (1975) offers two
4perspectives that are helpful in determining the precise 
nature of a hindrance to teaching or to learning. First, 
is the hindrance an "innocent" one? In other words, does 
it arise in the form of a natural event such as a 
thunderstorm or hurricane that causes an interruption in 
a power supply? Or second, does the hindrance betray 
deliberate intentions to obstruct particular activities, 
as would an administrative decision to withdraw research 
funds from a project that is considered "professionally 
desirable?"
The effects of academic freedom in a system of 
higher education are of fundamental importance to this 
study. Does the presence of academic freedom in a 
college or university influence the careers of that 
institution's professors?
Academic Freedom in a World Gone Mad
During the 1800s and early 1900s, German 
universities were generally accepted as having evolved 
into the premier institutions of higher learning in 
Europe. Foreign students who were studying at 
universities in Berlin, Heidelberg and Leipzig during 
this time filled educational journals with articles that 
praised the scholarly life that they were experiencing 
(Hofstadter and Smith, 1961). After the end of the
5American Civil War, students in the United States 
experienced limited opportunities for scientific research 
or for serious contemplation of studies due to the lack 
of scholarship in American colleges. Opportunities paled 
in light of what they read about educational institutions 
in Germany (Rudolph, 1962).
By the late 1890s, however, some American students 
who had decided to study abroad began to show signs of 
disenchantment with German universities. These scholars 
were slowly gaining enough confidence to evaluate the 
German model of higher education with a more 
discriminating eye--accepting those aspects, such as the 
research ideal, which they liked, and moving away from 
those, such as an extreme emphasis on certain subjects, 
which they did not like (Veysey, 1965).
On November 11, 1918, with the loss of World War I, 
Germany became a republic under the stipulations of the 
Treaty of Versailles. Most German professors bitterly 
rejected both the Treaty and the newly formed Weimar 
Republic. Since they were convinced that the Republic 
had been forced upon the people by the Allies and that 
such democratic forms of government were "un-German," 
these professors used their lectures and writings to 
present dangerous nationalistic themes, such as the 
build-up of German armed forces to protect the honor of
6the Fatherland, in spite of such moves being in direct 
violation of the stipulations of the Treaty of Versailles 
(Kelly, 1972). They "fell out" of society as a result of 
their embitterment against the elite class that they felt 
was embodied in the Weimar Republic (Ringer, 1948).
Additionally, they were also distressed by the 
decline of their lecture fees. These fees made up 
approximately half of their income and were now being 
paid in highly inflated currency. A  loss in social 
prestige accompanied the professors' financially 
deteriorating status, as personal wealth had been an 
effective facilitator to their social aspirations (Kelly, 
1972). It was such views that fueled the fires of 
dissent throughout the nation and made the even more 
extreme nationalism of zealous National Socialists 
(Nazis) appear comparatively moderate (Kneller, 1941).
When the Nazi candidate Adolph Hitler took office as 
Chancellor in 1933, the professoriate regarded him as a 
temporary presence to be endured until his promises to 
ameliorate the injustices of the Treaty of Versailles 
could be implemented (Kneller, 1941; Lilge, 1975; 
Beyerchen, 1977). Since the academic community had 
chosen to tolerate Hitler's presence, his National 
Socialist Party met with no substantive opposition when 
they moved to control the Weimar universities. The
7Nazis' initial efforts were directed toward a 
modification of the tenets of academic freedom so as to 
facilitate the attainment of their ultimate political 
goal of transforming the professoriate into an instrument
of unquestioning support for the State (1941) .
Up to this point in time, professors had always 
insisted that freedom of research and impartiality in 
learning--the basic constructs of the German model of 
academic freedom--be maintained in order to preserve the 
integrity of the university. However, members of 
university faculties quietly stood by as Hitler altered 
these revered ideals. Professors raised few objections 
when he insinuated that their personal research projects 
were, in actuality, occasions for the development of 
ideas in opposition to the fundamental aims of National 
Socialism (Kneller, 1941; Beyerchen, 1977).
Hitler expected the professoriate to acknowledge the
inherent superiority of the Aryan race and the innate
inferiority of anyone not aligned with the pure Germanic 
ideal (Kneller, 1941). The outcome of any deviation by a 
professor from these and other Nazi dictates was 
expulsion from his or her teaching position; indeed, over 
2,000 persons--almost 25% of the faculty that had been 
employed in German universities during the academic year
8of 1931-32--literally disappeared by the end of the 
winter semester of 1933-34 (Hartshorn, 1937).
Beginning in the 1930s, therefore, numerous members 
of German academia left their homeland in search of 
personal safety and professional opportunity in the 
United States. In fact, the number of intellectuals 
emigrating from continental Europe increased each year 
between 1930 and the early 1940s (Fermi, 1968). The 
magnitude of this Intellectual Diaspora was "so large and 
of such high [intellectual] quality that it constituted a 
new phenomenon in the history of immigration" (1968, 11).
Within this throng of highly educated immigrants 
there existed a subgroup of elite German scientists, 
including Albert Einstein (1879-1955), James Franck 
(1882-1964), Otto Meyerhof (1884-1951), and Otto Stern 
(1888-1969), who came to the United States. These four 
individuals, all of whom had either won the Nobel Prize 
in their chosen field or would soon move into laureate 
status, joined faculties of American institutions of 
higher education and renounced their allegiance to the 
Fatherland to become naturalized citizens of their 
adopted homeland.
Why did these men choose to leave Germany and come 
to the United States? To what degree was Hitler's effort
9to control the universities academic freedom related to 
their emigration?
After their arrival in the United States, these men 
had to adjust to a new system of higher education and to 
reestablish successful academic and research careers 
(Zuckerman, 1977; Geiger, 1986; Haffner, 1991). The 
model of academic freedom that Einstein, Franck,
Meyerhof, and Stern found in American universities had 
originally been influenced by the German concept of 
Lehrfreiheit {the freedom to teach); however, American 
scholars had extended the German parameters of academic 
freedom to also include freedom of speech and expression 
outside the educational institution (Hofstadter and 
Metzger, 1955; Poch, 1993). American professors 
believed that the freedom of expression guaranteed to 
every citizen was sufficient foundation for their claim 
to "extra-mural utterance." This claim was substantiated 
in the American Association of University Professors'
1915 General Declaration of Principles (Hofstadter and 
Smith, 1961).
In the years following the presentation of this 
declaration, questions about the application of the 
concept of "extra-mural utterance" surfaced. In pre- 
World War II America there was concern over the political 
ideologies of communism, fascism, and National Socialism
10
emerging from the European continent. Consequently, in 
an effort to discourage "un-American" opinions, a number 
of the forty-eight states enacted teacher-oath statutes 
(Brubacher and Rudy, 1958) . This legislation, which 
required a vocal support of state and federal 
constitutions, was considered by members of the 
professoriate as a limitation to their right to "extra­
mural" utterance. The oaths were not dissimilar in many 
respects to some of the nationalistic requirements of the 
Third Reich (1958) . Academic freedom in both Germany and 
the United States was being restricted by political 
forces.
What then were the similarities and dissimilarities 
between the condition of academic freedom in Germany at 
the time of Einstein, Franck, Meyerhof, and Stern's 
departure and that of academic freedom in America upon 
their arrival?
The Research Problem
The problem of this historical study is to evaluate 
the consequences that the politically-determined 
conventions of academic freedom in Germany and in the 
United States had on the careers of four elite scientists 
before and after their emigration resulting from the 
threats of Nazism. This problem consists of three
11
distinct conceptual parts: (1) academic freedom, as a 
concept, (2) the political conventions of academic 
freedom within pre-World War I- Germany and within pre- 
and World War II America, and (3) the effect that these 
definitions had on the careers of four elite scientists.
In order to solve the research problem, four 
research questions are posed. The first deals with the 
theory of academic freedom:
1. What forces impacted upon the evolution of the 
concept of academic freedom in Germany from 1800- 
1938 and in America from 1700-1940?
The next two questions take the concept of academic
freedom and place it into the context of pre-World War II
Germany and of pre-and World War II America:
2. What were the politically-determined conventions 
of academic freedom within pre-World War II Germany?
a. How was academic freedom manifested within 
and influenced by the Weimar Republic?
b. How did Hitler's efforts to control the 
German university affect academic freedom?
3. What were the politically-determined conventions 
of academic freedom within pre-and World War II 
America?
a. How did "wartime" influence academic 
freedom in America?
b. How was the right to intra-and extra-mural 
utterance preserved by the actions of the AAUP?
The fourth question addresses the effect that the German
and American models of academic freedom had on the
12
careers of these four elite scientists; Einstein,
Franck, Meyerhof, and Stern:
4. What elements of the political conventions of 
academic freedom effected the careers of these 
scientists before they left Germany and after they 
arrived in America?
a. What were the similarities and distinctions 
between the condition of academic freedom in 
Germany at the time of their departure and that 
of academic freedom in America upon their 
arrival?
b. Did American academic freedom permit 
these scientists a different arena for research 
and teaching than that which had existed in 
pre-World War II totalitarian Germany?
The Concept of Academic Freedom 
Searle (1975) argues that at the heart of any theory 
of academic freedom is the contention "that professors 
should have the right to teach, conduct research, and 
publish their research without interference..." (87). He 
argues that the justification for these prerogatives 
derives from the fundamental objective of the university 
of advancing and disseminating knowledge. In other 
words, in order for a professor to "pursue the truth 
unhindered" (Pincoffs, 1975) and for the outcome of that 
inquiry to be transmitted to others, an environment free 
from academic restraints must be in place (Searle, 1975).
Fuchs (1963) and Lovejoy (1930) also attach great 
importance to professors' being allowed to function
13
without hindrance from political, ecclesiastical, or 
administrative authority. Fuchs emphasizes that academic 
freedom "has been expanded in the United States 
to...protect the liberty to participate in extra-mural as 
well as intra-mural activities" (1963, 444). Lovejoy 
presents only one exception to the prohibition against 
interference with this liberty. In his definition of 
academic freedom, he argues that the sole occasion when a 
teacher or research worker may be challenged is if "his 
methods are found by qualified bodies of his own 
profession to be clearly incompetent or contrary to 
professional ethics" (1930, 384) .
My study compares and contrasts the manifestation of 
academic freedom in institutions of higher education both 
in Germany and in the United States during the 1930s and 
the early 1940s. I show how the political climate of 
these time periods influenced academic freedom's 
evolution in each national arena and in turn how its 
conventions then influenced the academic careers of the 
four emigrant nobel laureate scientists.
Academic Freedom in Germany
In defining academic freedom within pre-World War II 
Germany, I explain the concept's evolution beginning with 
Humboldt's work at the University of Berlin, continuing
14
through to the Weimar Republic and concluding with the 
National Socialists in the 1930s. From this point, I 
ascertain the influence that academic freedom's 
politically-determined conventions had upon the careers 
of Einstein, Franck, Meyerhof and Stern before their 
emigration from the threats of Nazism.
Academic Freedom in America 
An analysis of academic freedom in America 
demonstrates the concept's evolution from the 1700s to 
the early 1940s and the influence that its politically- 
determined conventions had upon the careers of Einstein, 
Franck, Meyerhof and Stern after their emigration from 
the threats of Nazism and their arrival in the United 
States. It includes a presentation of the American 
paradigm of academic freedom as it evolved over the 25 
years following its elucidation in the AAUP's 1915 
General Declaration of Principles. It was during this 
period that all of these scientists arrived in this 
country and began the process of assimilation into its 
culture and its system of higher education.
The Purpose of the Study 
The justification for my study is found in two 
areas. First, my analysis compares the influence that
15
the different politically-determined conventions of 
academic freedom had upon the careers of four elite 
scientists. Although numerous studies have focused on 
how and to what extent academic freedom has existed on 
college campuses (Alberty and Bode, 1938; Rudolph, 1962; 
Gay, 1968; McClelland, 1980) and several researchers have 
described the influence that political realities in 
American and Germany during the 1930s and early 1940s had 
upon academic freedom (Burlingham, Byrne, Seabury and 
Stimson, 1936; Hartshorne, 1937; Davie, 1947; Beyerchen, 
1977; Zuckerman, 1977), no inquiries have emphasized an 
evaluation of the influence that the politically- 
determined conventions of academic freedom had upon the 
careers of the scientists in this study.
Second, I address the limits which can be placed 
upon academic freedom when its principles are not 
safeguarded. The National Socialists' rise to power made 
it possible for them to implement their educational 
philosophy, which radically altered the exercise of 
academic freedom in German universities (Hartshorne,
1937; Kneller, 1941; Gallin, 1986). Likewise, the 
ethnocentrism and nationalism in the United States during 
the 1930s and early 1940s were manifested in the 
imposition of teacher oath laws and other limitations to
16
freedom of thought, speech, and teaching (Capen, 1937; 
Carlson and Lovejoy, 1937; Duggan, 1937; Tyler, 1937).
Research into the influence that different 
politically-determined conventions of academic freedom 
had upon the careers of four elite scientists and into 
the limits which can be placed upon academic freedom when 
its principles are not safeguarded is important because 
it illustrates that limitations to academic freedom can 
be manifested in either a socialistic dictatorship or a 
democratic republic. It reinforces the necessity of 
constant vigilance as the inevitable price of freedom.
Delimitations and Limitations 
Academic freedom is an educational practice whose 
roots go back to Socrates, Plato and Aristotle. It has 
been an issue of concern and debate as long as there have 
been teachers who taught the truth (Lovejoy, 1930; Fuchs, 
1963). When addressing an educational concept with such 
an extensive and wide-ranging heritage, limitations must 
be set as to the time frame within which it will be 
analyzed. For this reason, I established the 1930s as 
the central time period for my study.
I have limited this study to the careers of four 
particular German scientists who served on faculties of 
German institutions of higher education during pre-World
17
War II Germany because scholars from this time period 
would have experienced the shift from Weimar isolation to 
Nazi control. Further, I selected immigrant professors 
who became naturalized citizens of the United States 
after their emigration from Germany and who joined 
faculties of American institutions of higher education. 
The reason for this being that an evaluation of the 
influence of academic freedom upon their careers would 
provide supportive documentation for the comparative 
study of academic freedom and its influence on 
professorial careers. Finally, I chose Nobel laureates 
primarily because the personal notoriety generated by the 
receipt of a Nobel Prize should insure the availability 
of sufficient documentation for an accurate evaluation of 
various aspects of their careers.
This study is limited by the available research 
sources of records, personal diaries, published writings 
of the period and other documents. As is often the case 
with historical studies (including this one), the option 
of gathering primary data from personal interviews is 
eliminated as the individuals under study are deceased. 
Also, it is unfortunate that considerably less 
documentation is available on the career of Otto Stern 
than on those of Albert Einstein, James Franck, and Otto 
Meyerhof. No additional information on Stern was found
18
after (1) speaking with Dr. Prank Mecklingburg of New 
York's Leo Baeck Institute, which is a library dedicated 
to the collection of volumes that contain information 
about German-speaking Jews from central Europe; (2) 
contacting Mr. Kenneth Schoen, who is a specialist in 
scholarly out-of-print and used Judaica texts on exiles; 
and (3) talking to the research librarian of the Research 
Institute of the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum 
in Washington, D. C. The paucity of material available 
on this one scholar limited the evaluation of his career.
CHAPTER 2 
REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE
Introduction
"...[T]he interaction between the university's own 
built-in conservatism and the pressures upon it to adapt 
to new external conditions is one of the most potentially 
illuminating...aspects of the process of historical 
change" {Stone, 1974, vol. I, v ) . Looking at the 
interactive nature of the relationship between the 
university and its environment, academic freedom is one 
particular dynamic of that relationship whose parameters 
have often been the subject of heated debate during those 
occasions when institution and society conflict. The 
development and influence of this somewhat abrasive 
catalyst during certain historical periods serve as the 
underlying themes of this review of related literature.
The Concept of Academic Freedom 
Academic freedom is viewed as the prerogative of 
scholars "to be left free from interference or punishment 
to teach and to publish what they sincerely believe to be 
true" (Jones, 1975, 38). The conviction of academics, as
19
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with Socrates when he chose hemlock rather than 
capitulation to state demands to alter his teachings, has 
been that they be allowed to present their studied view 
of truth with the intention of equipping their students 
with the capacity, as Max Weber argued, "to think 
clearly1 (Shils, 1973, 37) . As a result of the tension 
occasionally created by this conviction, the issue of 
academic freedom has been for centuries the subject of 
debate. In order to gain a full-orbed understanding of 
this fundamental concept, an appropriate starting point, 
as the roots of the concept of the modern university can 
be traced there, is the Middle Ages (Franklin, 1981; 
Pulliam, 1987).
Ushered in by the death of the last Carolingian 
Emperor in 877, the Middle Ages were replete with 
barbarian attacks upon western Europe from the North. As 
a result of the terror and disruption these invasions 
caused, medieval populations chose to rally around local 
strongmen, thereby becoming dependent upon them for their 
lives and their livelihood (Franklin, 1981; Kagan,
Ozment, and Turner, 1983) . Fear of annihilation was a 
component of the fidelity that the common people showed 
to their feudal masters and of the contempt that they had 
for foreigners. This aversion to foreigners initially 
led to the formation of scholastic guilds, universitas.
21
which were designed for the protection and support of 
foreign students. Although guilds had no campus and no 
administrative structure, they permitted the medieval 
professor to teach truth. However, the Middle Ages' 
concept of truth required faculty to expound upon that 
which had already been revealed by a higher 
ecclesiastical or political authority, not to search 
freely for something that was as yet undiscovered 
(Thelin, 1982, Haskins, 1984). This early model of 
intellectual liberty was a precursor of its modern 
counterpart, academic freedom.
The constant fear of impending devastation by 
invading barbarians that was a reality of life in the 
Middle Ages was replaced by the comparative security of 
the Renaissance. Historians generally mark the beginning 
of the Renaissance with the fall of Constantinople to the 
Ottoman Turks in 1453, an event that resulted in scholars 
of the Byzantine Empire fleeing to western Europe for 
safety (Thompson and Hicks, 1985). When these academics 
arrived, they found the ties between academic activity 
and strict ecclesiastical authority and influence 
loosening as a result of the doubts that were developing 
in the freer atmosphere of the Renaissance (Franklin,
1981).
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Additionally, a new heightened regard for 
individuality also contributed to the reappraisal of 
authority structures in general. The philosophical basis 
for the Renaissance's increased emphasis upon the dignity 
of man and his individualism, commonly labeled Humanism, 
served to move scholars to promote an increased awareness 
of the need for political and civic liberty {Kagan et 
al., 1983).
Humanism provided scholars with a theoretical 
perspective that influenced the scope, or development, of 
intellectual freedom. Academics began to draw their own 
conclusions about the Classics, not necessarily mimicking 
the views of previously recognized scholastic 
authorities. This heady atmosphere fostered a 
considerably freer academic environment for intellectual 
pursuits than had ever existed during the Middle Ages 
(Fuchs, 1963; Fleming, 1980; Haskins, 1984).
The questioning of authority that was a hallmark of 
the Renaissance prepared the way for the Protestant 
Reformation in Germany; with the precipitous event in 
1517 being Martin Luther's presentation of his "95 
Theses," which contained direct challenges to papal 
practices (Fleming, 1980; Kagan et al., 1983). Academic 
institutions were influenced by scholars fresh with 
excitement over the liberty they anticipated developing
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as a result of the ever-increasing interest in humanistic 
philosophy. The professoriate soon realized, however, 
that liberty was much easier to contemplate than to 
apply. Instead of finding encouragement and support from 
their ecclesiastical superiors, professors came face-to- 
face with opposition from church leaders who felt 
threatened by the increasing intellectual liberty being 
enjoyed by academics (Pincoffs, 1975; Fleming, 1980).
In the early 1500s, noteworthy scholar Johann Wessel 
of Gansfort, who taught Greek and Hebrew at Heidelberg, 
had his writings characterized by university officials as 
inappropriate for dissemination to students. The 
influential ecclesiastical hierarchy labeled Wessel's 
ideas as being disintegrative of their allegiance to the 
Pope (Thomas and Hicks, 1985). It is noteworthy that the 
professoriate and the university, two entities that by 
design must work in close proximity with one another and 
that have similar theoretical foundations--the discovery 
and propagation of truth--surface at cross purposes when 
each is faced with pressure from the fluctuating 
political and social agendas around them (Veysey, 1965; 
Pincoffs, 1975).
Over the next 200 years, with the decline of the 
influence of the ecclesiastical system over the academic 
arena, scientists-scholars like Galileo and Newton, were
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revered with an almost God-like status as they were 
individuals capable of solving the mysteries of the 
universe and displaying their results with mathematical 
precision. In like manner, political philosophers such 
as Locke offered solutions to the excesses of 
governmental authority by presenting all men as being 
"equal and independent" {Kagan et al., 1983, 526). The 
concept of individual freedom of thought that was 
developed out of this egalitarian philosophy allowed 
professors to begin to extend the limits of intellectual 
activity beyond the borders set for them by previous 
thinkers (1983).
The German Model of Academic Freedom 
One extension of this intellectual activity that 
surfaced at the beginning of the 1800s was the German 
educational reform posed by Wilhelm von Humboldt. As head 
of the educational bureaucracy in Germany, he was 
determined to support university reform and greatly 
influenced changes at the University of Berlin. Berlin's 
founding in 1810 marked the beginning of the modern 
period of German university development. Humboldt's 
efforts were primarily directed at removing the influence 
of the Germanic princes and in establishing the 
university as a "privileged corporation with self-
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governing rights.1' (Samuel and Thomas, 1971, 113). By 
endowing universities with self-governing corporate 
status, Humboldt's intent was to remove them from the 
whims of political influence and censorship that were 
inherent in their state as "royal" institutions 
(Beyerchen, 1977).
Humboldt imbued the concept of academic freedom with 
two fundamental principles that influenced subsequent 
models. The first principle, Lehrfreiheit. was the 
freedom of teaching. He argued that the professor should 
be free from restraint to follow his convictions while 
teaching, and should be free to select his lecture 
subjects and to not follow a government-prescribed 
syllabus. Humboldt's second principle, Lernfreiheit. was 
the freedom of study; the student was free to attend 
whatever lectures he wished and could constantly shift 
from one university to another during his academic career 
(Samuel and Thomas, 1971) . Such concepts were embraced 
by some of the faculty and slowly began to develop in the 
fertile environment that such liberty provided. However, 
these ideas of German educational reform were ultimately 
destined to be implemented only as far as the state's 
educational officials allowed (Thompson and Hicks, 1985).
By the latter 1800s, the several German 
principalities had been molded into one unified state
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through the diplomatic efforts of Prussian Chancellor, 
Otto von Bismarck (Franklin, 1981; Thompson and Hicks,
1985) . This new government's centralized educational 
ministry became the one primary source for university 
funding. From this vantage point, members of the state 
educational ministry could pick and choose those concepts 
that they would allow members of the professoriate to 
propagate (Ringer, 1969; Kelly, 1972). This strong 
governmental presence in academic circles continued 
through the end of World War X in 1918, when Germany 
became a republic (Franklin, 1981).
Universities in the Weimar Republic, where according 
to writers such as Abraham Flexner (1932) academic 
freedom was alive and well, were in actuality fraught 
with religious and political discrimination. The 
situation was so desperate that Max Weber, a prominent 
German scholar and social scientist, upon hearing that a 
friend's political and religious views made it impossible 
for him to secure a teaching position in Germany, stated 
in an open letter that he was "unable to behave as if we 
possessed a freedom of teaching which somebody could 
still take away from us" (Ringer, 1969, 143).
This case was typical of other situations where 
blatant acts of discrimination resulted in the 
development of a mutant version of Humbolt's original
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model of academic freedom, which allowed for a diversity 
of opinion within the university faculty (Gallin, 1986).
" [German universities] were [becoming]...nurseries of a 
woolly-minded militarist idealism and centers of 
resistance to the new in art or the social sciences;
Jews, democrats, socialists, in a word outsiders, were 
kept from the sacred precincts of higher learning" (Gay, 
1968, 3).
Largely due to the Weimar Republic's support of the 
Treaty of Versailles, conservative professors gradually 
became disillusioned with the government. These 
professors believed that the Treaty's stipulations that 
Germany pay reparations to the Allies was unacceptable 
and "un-German." They also felt that such policies were 
taking Germany into a period of economic decline. 
Government funds were going to pay the war reparations 
stipulated at Versailles; therefore, there was less money 
available to pay state employees such as professors 
(Kandel, 1935; Kelly, 1972).
After little more than thirteen years in power, the 
Weimar Republic began to loose control of the political 
sphere. By the time of the national elections in 1932, 
the German economy was near collapse. To meet the 
increased demands for state money to pay war debts, the 
government printed more and more "marks." The
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uncontrolled inflation that resulted left the mark 
practically valueless and over six million workers 
unemployed. These circumstances, coupled with a 
nationalistic resentment over the impact of Germany 
having lost World War I, led to the National Socialist 
(Nazi) Party gaining control of the Reichstag and Hitler 
being appointed by President Hindenburg as Chancellor of 
Germany (Hoover, 1933; Rodes, 1964; Franklin, 1981).
The Nazi Party immediately focused their efforts 
toward controlling the educational system.
"The...[influence of the] National Socialist regime [was] 
devoted to two main tasks, first to destroy all vestiges 
of the contributions to education made during the 
Republican period, and, second, to build up a new 
philosophy of education based on the doctrines of the 
Revolution" (Kandel, 1935, 33). The Nazis saw 
institutions of higher learning as potential instruments 
for the advancement of their political agenda. Because 
the National Socialist Party felt that some professors 
had sacrificed the common national interest to their own 
narrow concerns, the Nazis had to "save the universities 
and found them on the soil of the national (volkish) 
idea...to give [them] body and soul, and to hasten 
[their] development in the light of racial theory" (1935, 
53) .
29
The Nazis' adjustments to the German model of 
academic freedom were based upon their determination to 
alter the concepts of freedom of teaching and research to 
meet the needs of the totalitarian state. To ensure 
loyalty, Hitler decided that promotion within the ranks 
of the university faculty was to be determined, not by 
peers, but by Nazi state officials who would make 
candidates swear to teach and conduct research solely in 
the interest of the state. Policies such as this brought 
about the dismantling of Humboldt's German model of 
academic freedom {Kandel, 1935; Ringer, 1969; Gallin,
1986).
The American Model of Academic Freedom 
Much of the struggle for academic freedom in America 
centered around the idea that intellectual liberty 
included freedom of thought, speech, and writing.
Although professors generally considered intellectual 
liberty to be their right, there were some ecclesiastical 
and political authorities who considered it to be a 
privilege over which they alone had authority. This 
conflict between a professor's view of his rights and a 
collegiate governing board's view as to their 
jurisdiction began to surface after the American
30
Revolutionary War (Hofstadter and Metzger, 1955; Cohen,
1968).
As citizens in a new and independent nation, 
Americans were eager to move into the period of discovery 
and expansion that lay ahead of them (Cohen, 1986) . The 
classically-based curriculum of the colonial college did 
not equip its graduates to function successfully within 
this emerging frontier society (Lowman, 1983). Instead, 
the call was for institutions of higher education with 
utility-centered curricula that would academically outfit 
the graduate to face the needs of this new nation 
(Portman, 1972; 1983) . Such reform in the content of 
collegiate course work and in curriculum design required 
educators to move into higher levels of scholarship and 
research. This provided an opportunity for professors so 
equipped to become more involved in the decision-making 
processes of their colleges (French, 1964; 1972; Herbst,
1982).
As the curriculum was expanded, more funds were 
needed to support the innovative programs being offered. 
This put college boards and administrators in need of 
increased amounts of state monies and consequently moved 
them closer to the political realm. University boards, 
whose political views were generally similar to those of 
their governmental benefactors, did not want their
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faculty members to express views that conflicted with the 
political status quo. One particularly explosive issue 
was slavery. Depending upon the political climate of the 
area, being in support of or in opposition to this issue 
could either cost a university its funding or a professor 
his position (Brubacher and Rudy, 1958; French, 1964; 
Portman, 1972).
As colleges were attempting to expand their 
programs, progress was not always being made quickly 
enough for young scholars. When these men looked at the 
universities in Germany, they saw institutions that were 
offering a higher level of learning than they could find 
at home. Consequently, many of these students chose to 
continue their studies abroad in universities at Berlin 
and Gottingen. While in Germany, they had the 
opportunity to see the concepts of Lehrfreiheit. freedom 
of teaching, and Lernfreiheit. freedom of learning, 
establishing an environment of free intellectual activity 
that they wanted to transfer to their academic 
institutions in America (Thwing, 1928; Flexner, 1932; 
Hofstadter and Metzger, 1955; Veysey, 1965).
Upon returning home, these scholars extended the 
German model of academic freedom to include the right to 
extra-mural utterance, the freedom to address issues of 
their choice beyond the campus of their college or
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university. Professors believed that their 
constitutional guarantee to freedom of speech served as 
the foundation for their claim. It was this professorial 
contention that led to confrontations with university 
boards and financial supporters when they did not agree 
with a professor's position (Thwing, 1928; Veysey, 1965; 
Portman, 1972).
By the early 1900s, professors who were exercising 
their right to extra-mural utterance were concerned that 
they did not have an arena to which they could appeal 
when they felt their rights were being infringed. It was 
out of this concern and frustration that college 
professors founded the American Association of University 
Professors (AAUP) in 1915 as an organization dedicated to 
the protection of the principles of academic freedom 
{Hofstadter and Metzger, 1955; Brubacher and Rudy, 1958; 
Pulliam, 1987).
Over the next 25 years, the AAUP issued five major 
statements which charted the course for the development 
of academic freedom in America. The first such document 
was the 1915 Declaration of Principles, which set forth 
the right of professors to pursue the truth unhindered as 
well as the right to intra- and extra-mural utterance 
(Alberty and Bode, 1938; Joughin, 1969; Hendersen and 
Hendersen, 1975; Karier, 1986). The second document was
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the Report of the Committee on Academic Freedom in
Wartime, which was presented in 1918. This Report stated 
that restrains could be placed upon the academic freedom 
of professors during a time of war; but, that these 
limitations could not go beyond those expected of the 
average citizen (Report, 1918; Bearde and Bearde, 1930; 
Bentwich, 1953; Brubacher and Rudy, 1958; Finkelstein, 
1984).
The third document was the 1925 Statement on 
Academic Freedom. This report was the product of 
collaborative efforts on the part of several national 
educational organizations. One major benefit of this 
report to college and university professors was that 
various national organizations had worked together on 
this project and that they were all available to assist 
in investigations of possible infringements upon academic 
freedom (Alberty and Bode, 1938; Bentwich, 1953; 
Hofstadter and Metzger, 1955). The fourth document was 
the 1937 Statement of Committee B in which the AAUP 
responded to the controversy over teacher loyalty oaths, 
which required professors to pledge their allegiance to 
state and federal constitutions. The Committee stated 
that scholars should be permitted to discuss 
controversial issues; therefore, they could not tolerate
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limitations upon their academic freedom (Carlson, 1937; 
Alberty and Bode, 1938; Knight and Hall, 1951).
The final document was the 1940 Statement of 
Principles and Interpretive Comments on Academic Freedom 
and Tenure, which became the most widely known and 
endorsed statement of its kind in America (Poch, 1993).
As a product of the joint efforts of the AAUP and the 
American Association of Colleges, an organization of 
college presidents, this report restated the principles 
of academic freedom in order to ensure that the 
constitutionally-guaranteed rights of those who seek to 
teach the truth are maintained within a society that has 
the right to know the truth (Joughin, 1969; Poch, 1993).
The Careers of Four Elite Scientists
The careers of Albert Einstein, James Franck, Otto 
Meyerhof and Otto Stern, thrived during the Weimar 
period, suffered during Germany's transition to National 
Socialism, and culminated in institutions of higher 
education in America (Weber, 1980; Magill, 1989). Each 
of these men won a Nobel Prize and was recognized as 
being part of the elite international scientific 
community of the first half of the Twentieth Century 
(Heathcote, 1953; Estermann, 1959; Zukerman, 1977). What 
adds additional interest to their already illustrious
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careers are the times in which they lived and the choices 
they made in response to the influence of those times 
upon the institutions of higher education in which they 
served (Bentwich, 1953; Fermi, 1968; Beyerchen, 1977),
Germany had lost the "War To End All Wars"
(Franklin, 1981, 198) and her destiny was now in the 
hands of its victors, all of whom wanted her to pay 
dearly for the over 40 million lives that had been 
claimed by the conflict. The Treaty of Versailles, 
signed in 1919, stipulated that Germany relinquish one- 
seventh of her land, all of her overseas territories, and 
pay reparations. Largely as a result of these 
requirements, the country was bankrupt, both financially 
and emotionally; resentment had begun to build against 
those countries that the German people felt were exacting 
their "pound of flesh" from a nation that had nothing 
left to give (Hoover, 1933; Kelly, 1972; Fleming, 1980; 
Franklin, 1981).
It was during these turbulent times just after World 
War I that Einstein, Franck, Meyerhof, and Stern were 
researching, experimenting and teaching in German 
universities. Each man had been recognized and lauded 
for efforts in his field. Einstein, whose "General 
Theory of Relativity" had been published in 1915, and 
whose Nobel Prize in Physics in 1921 had firmly ensconced
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him as an international celebrity, was serving as a 
professor of physics at the University of Berlin. A 
recipient of the 1925 Nobel Prize in Physics, Franck had 
accepted the position of Director of the Zweite 
Physikalische Institut in 1920 (Weber, 1980; Magill,
1989; Fox, Meldrum, and Rezak, 1990).
While serving at the Department of Physiology at the 
University of Kiel, Meyerhof had won the Nobel Prize for 
Medicine and Physiology in 1922. He later moved to the 
Kaiser Wilhelm Institute for Medical Research in 
Heidelberg and was working there as the head of the 
Department of Physiology in 1929. Stern, who was deeply 
involved in his molecular-beam research, was serving as 
Director of the laboratory at the University of Hamberg 
(Beyerchen, 1977; Jackman and Borden, 1983, MacPherson,
1986).
All of these scientists were involved in research 
projects at highly respected Weimar universities.
Although academic freedom in such institutions was 
occasionally marred by discrimination against Jews, these 
four elite, Jewish scientists enjoyed considerable 
respect in scholastic circles, due to their significant 
scientific and intellectual achievements (Davie, 1947; 
Farber, 1953) .
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After Hitler became Germany's Chancellor on January 
30, 1933, the atmosphere of intellectual freedom within 
which the academic careers of these scientists thrived 
disintegrated. Slightly more than two months after 
assuming power, Hitler had convinced the Reichstag to 
pass the Civil Service Law on April 7, 1933 (Franklin, 
1981). The initial implementation of this law led to 
over a thousand scholars--classified as either 
"politically unreliable" or "non-Aryan"--being 
immediately forced to leave their academic positions 
(Fermi, 1968; Beyerchen, 1977; 1981).
On May 10, 1933, the works of authors ranging from 
Marx to Einstein were flung into bonfires at the 
University of Berlin and elsewhere across Germany, all in 
the name of "Action Against the Un-German Spirit"
(Jackman and Borden, 1983, 31). The universities became 
the instrument for the dissemination of Nazi policy that 
would endorse the National Socialist agenda (Grunberger, 
1971; Beyerchen, 1977).
The careers of Einstein, Franck, Meyerhof, and 
Stern, which previously had been immune to the effects of 
discrimination, suddenly had to endure religious and 
political bigotry. Einstein, who was serving as a 
Director of the Kaiser Wilhelm Society in 1933, left 
Germany to take a position at the Institute for Advanced
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Study in Princeton. Franck resigned his professorship at 
Gottingen in 1933 and spent over a year in Copenhagen, 
Denmark, before accepting a professorial post in 1935 at 
Johns Hopkins University in Baltimore (Asimov, 1964;
Fermi, 1968; Zuckerman, 1977).
Meyerhof remained in Germany until 1938, when he 
left to work briefly in Paris, prior to coming to America 
in 1940 to accept a position as a professor at the 
University of Pennsylvania (Fox et al., 1990). Stern 
left his post at the University of Hamburg in 1933 and 
founded a molecular-beam laboratory at the Carnegie 
Institute of Technology in Pittsburgh during the same 
year (Weber, 1980).
Once established in American universities, they all 
became naturalized citizens of the United States. These 
men had chosen, for the culmination of their careers, an 
academic environment that contained some limitations and 
prejudices; but, generally provided fertile ground for 
continued development of their extraordinary abilities 
(Fermi, 1968; Weber, 1980; Hielbut, 1983; Jackman and
Borden, 1983; Clark, 1984) .
Conclusion
Scholars have defined the concept of academic
freedom for application to the university setting as
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early as 1915 (Brubacher and Rudy, 1958; Pincoffs, 1975), 
and have exhorted administrators and their professorial 
colleagues to safeguard its presence on campuses 
(Metzger, 1977; Poch, 1993) throughout the century. Even 
today, the concept continues to be analyzed and 
translated for the younger members of the professoriate 
(Clark, 1984; Renneberg and Walker, 1994). The concept 
has intrigued faculty throughout the century because at 
various times, certain non-faculty groups have sought and 
managed to curb professional speech in the name of 
various political expediencies. These attempts to bridle 
academic freedom have occurred in various western 
countries, including both the United States and Germany.
Although numerous scholars (Pulliam, 1982; Craig, 
1984; Macrakis, 1993) have provided examples of 
institutional and governmental policies that restricted 
faculty speech, none has made an evaluation of the 
consequences that the politically-determined conventions 
of academic freedom have had on the careers of professors 
before and after their emigration from the threats of 
Nazism. It is the intent of this study to make such an 
evaluation.
CHAPTER 3 
METHODOLOGY
The methodology that would beat suit an evaluation 
of the consequences of the politically-determined 
conventions of academic freedom on the careers of great 
scientists would be to interview these men in person; 
however, as all four of the scientists in this study are 
deceased, gathering interview-generated data is an 
impossibility. That being the case, the appropriate 
methodology is the historical case study.
Historical research focuses upon the interpretation 
and significance of individuals and events. Strictly 
defined, it is "...the process of critical inquiry into 
past events to produce an accurate description and 
interpretation of those events" (Wiersma, 1986, 219) ; 
therefore, since historical research does not permit 
either the control or manipulation of historical 
phenomenon, it is suited to this study (Yin, 1984).
Case study methodology does permit an analysis of 
motivations. Studying the way individuals respond to 
external realities, evaluating how they accommodate 
themselves to those realities, how they fight to break
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out of them, or even how they attempt to change them--all 
adapt well to case study research (Hakim, 1987).
Employing a methodology that allows the analysis of such 
motivations is particularly helpful when analyzing the 
decisions made by each of these four scientists as they 
distanced themselves from the Nazi regime and emigrated 
to the United States.
Fundamental to historical research is a review of 
the related literature. This process establishes a 
context for the direction of the research and for 
interpreting its results (Wiersma, 1986). Primary 
sources, "original or firsthand accounts of the event or 
experience" (wiersma, 1986, 220), and secondary sources, 
"accounts that are at least once removed from the event" 
(1986, 220), are used to establish an understanding of 
the historical period under study (1986). A 
comprehensive evaluation of the consequences of the 
politically-determined conventions of academic freedom 
upon the careers of four individuals requires the 
compilation of considerable research. The research base 
facilitates a deeper understanding of the historical 
setting in which these individuals lived as well as a 
more fully developed comprehension of the educational 
concept involved in the evaluation.
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This historical case study employs an embedded 
research design (Yin, 1984). The embedded design 
facilitates connecting the research done on the initial 
issue of the study--academic freedom--to an evaluation of 
the consequences that its politically-determined 
conventions had on the careers of four elite scientists 
before and after their emigration from the threats of 
Nazism.
The reason for the selection of this multiple-case 
research strategy is that, as a robust design, it draws 
evidence from several different cases instead of from 
only one. The evaluation of each of the cases (the 
careers of the four elite scientists) follows 
"replication” logic; that is, each of the four careers is 
expected to have been influenced by the politically- 
determined conventions of academic freedom thereby 
"replicating" or "repeating" the expected outcome (Yin, 
1984) .
Each man's academic career has been selected with 
the expectation that it was influenced by the 
politically-determined conventions of academic freedom. 
"The ability to conduct [four] ... case studies, arranged 
effectively within a multiple-case design, is analogous 
to the ability to conduct [four] ...experiments on related 
topics....If all the cases turn out as predicted, these
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[four]...cases...would provide compelling support for the 
initial... [question]1 (Yin, 1984, 53). In this study, 
such "support" is a justification for the question: Did
the politically-determined conventions of academic 
freedom have consequences for the careers of four elite 
scientists before and after their emigration from the 
threats of Nazism?
This historical research follows the four steps 
suggested by Wiersma (1986). First, is the 
identification of the research problem, which includes 
conjectures about characteristics of the situation under 
study (1986). In this case, the research problem is to 
evaluate the consequences that the politically-determined 
conventions of academic freedom had on the careers of 
four elite scientists before and after their emigration 
from the threats of Nazism.
Second, is the collection and evaluation of resource 
materials. These procedures involve more than the mere 
gathering together of research that is related to the 
problem. Resources must be closely examined so as to 
determine from where they came and by whom they were 
produced. This process of "external criticism" 
establishes the validity or authenticity of documents.
In addition, resources must be examined in order to 
determine their accuracy as well as their meaning. This
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process of "internal criticism" establishes whether or 
not resource materials are trustworthy (Wiersma, 1986) .
Third, is the synthesis of information. Once 
resource materials have been subjected to external and 
internal criticism, they can then be reviewed so as to 
determine their value in relationship to each other.
This process facilitates the elimination of secondary 
sources that duplicate the material found in primary 
sources. It also is the point in evaluation where 
inconsistencies that arise from contradictory reports 
must be resolved either through further research or by an 
alteration in the research question (Wiersma, 1986).
Fourth, is the analysis, interpretation and 
formulation of conclusions. The basis for these three 
procedures is a logical evaluation of the information 
that has been extracted from the resource material. 
Ascertaining which are the essential points of the 
information gathered, presenting the meaning of that 
information, and making a final determination about that 
information in light of the original research question is 
the last step in historical research (Wiersma, 1986).
CHAPTER 4
THE EVOLUTION OP THE MODERN MODEL OF ACADEMIC FREEDOM
IN GERMANY 
1800-1938
Introduction
The account of the evolution of the modern model of 
academic freedom in Germany is a narrative of a struggle 
for control of a nation's intellectual freedom. Moving 
through the decades between 1800 and 1938, that struggle 
occurred within and between the state's political agenda 
and the university's desire to pursue the truth, 
unhindered. The dawn of the modern evolution of this 
conflict began with the conquest of numerous German 
principalities and duchies by the armies of Napoleon at 
the beginning of the nineteenth century. These conflicts 
resulted in intellectuals and political activists from 
the smaller German states fleeing to the security of the 
largest, and as yet unconquered Germanic kingdom,
Prussia. There, they believed, they would still find the 
freedom to proclaim the need for a great German national 
awakening, a right that they felt had been denied in the
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face of the French occupation of their homelands (Rodes, 
1964; Maurois, 1966; Thompson and Hicks, 1985).
Their hopes for liberty were endangered when 
Napoleon conquered Prussia and filled it with his 
occupying army; however, the presence of French forces on 
Prussian soil incited the Prussian population to 
outbursts of nationalism (Rodes, 1964; Maurois, 1966; Van 
de Graaff, 1975). Ernst Moritz Arndt, a German poet, 
articulated this doctrine of German national pride in his 
book, The Spirit of the Time: uWe live in a beautiful,
large, rich land, a land of glorious memories, undying 
deeds, unforgettable service to the world in remote and 
recent times. We are the navel of Europe...we are as 
good as the best...German! What a name and what a 
people" (1964, 266)1
One manifestation of this nationalistic surge 
fostered by the immigrant intellectuals and political 
activists was the improvement of institutions of higher 
education in Prussia. Frederick William III, ruler of 
Prussia, looked to the state universities to assist him 
in "replacing, by intellectual strength, the material 
forces [the state] had lost" (Rodes, 1964, 271). He 
appointed Baron Karl Wilhelm von Humboldt as chief of the 
Department of Worship and Public Instruction and, in 
1810, provided him with the funds necessary to establish
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a royal university in Berlin (Samuel and Thomas, 1971;
Van de Graaff, 1975).
Humboldt and Berlin
Frederick wanted the University of Berlin to become 
"the center of all intellectual activity in northern, 
Protestant Germany" (Rodes, 1964, 272). His advisors 
counseled him to use the University as a tool for the 
political reform and reorientation of Prussia. Frederick 
recognized the tremendous influence that teachers could 
exert upon the minds of their students. He, along with 
his advisors, anticipated that state universities would 
facilitate Germany's national renewal through ideas and 
public opinion (1964; McClelland, 1980).
Humboldt's view of the role of the university in 
general and the University of Berlin in particular was 
quite different from Frederick's. He did not see higher 
education as an instrument to be used to dispense state 
propaganda into the lecture halls and ultimately into the 
minds of the students. On the contrary, he felt that 
universities were too closely controlled and directed by 
governmental bureaucrats with agendas designed to prepare 
intellectuals to serve the state. He believed that the 
university should be free to cultivate the uniqueness of 
each individual and prepare him for a lifelong voyage of
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personal development--not be directed to produce human 
instruments that would increase the state's power and 
prosperity (Rodes, 1984; Maurois, 1966; McClelland,
1980) .
With the intent of lessening the state's control, 
Humboldt urged Frederick to accord the University of 
Berlin status as a corporation with self-governing 
rights, a status that would have meant emancipation from 
the whims of political influence and censorship. His 
proposal was vehemently opposed by the Prussian 
educational bureaucracy which knew that it inevitably 
would loose considerable power under such a system 
(Beyerchen, 1977; McClelland, 1980) .
Much of the bureaucracy's control was derived from 
its prerogative to select appointees to fill positions in 
state institutions like the universities. Not only did 
these career bureaucrats not want to sacrifice their 
authority, they also did not want to create a situation 
where the universities would be free to propagate ideas 
that were contrary to those of the state. They 
successfully lobbied the King and, as a result,
Humboldt's proposal was not instituted (Gay, 1968; Van de 
Graaff, 1975; McClelland, 1980).
Additionally, many of the professors, who were 
bureaucratic appointees, did not embrace Humboldt's
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ideas, fearing that their positions would be jeopardized. 
They felt Humboldt's proposal to institutionalize 
safeguards to preserve their intellectual freedom from 
state interference was unnecessary (Gay, 1968; Ringer,
1969); instead, they relied upon the idea that the 
"worldly setting in which the search for truth takes 
place is not capable of seriously distorting the results 
of that search" (1968, 112). By assuming that the state 
could not distort "pure learning," they believed they 
were able to maintain the security of their positions and 
the integrity of their intellectual pursuits.
Humboldt's fundamental problem with state control of 
the university, the professoriate, and the students was 
based upon its treatment of the citizenry and their 
institutions as instruments by which it could increase 
its power and prosperity (Lilge, 1975). This was a theme 
he presented several years earlier in his famous essay on 
The Sphere and Duties of Government. His writings often 
resounded with the necessity of maintaining an 
individual's freedom in order to preserve an individual's 
dignity:
He was pleading for a form of social organization 
which would allow complete freedom for the self­
activity of the mind, for the growth of indigenous 
interests, for the expression of genuine tastes and
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beliefs, and for the formation of sincere and 
intimate relationships between human beings (1975,
9) .
This concept, demonstrated in the details of his model of 
academic self-government, established the guiding 
parameters for the evolution of Germany's modern model of 
academic freedom (Beyerchen, 1977).
Humboldt set forth three principles that he 
considered necessary for the freedom of the intellect to 
be established and the fruits of that freedom to grow. 
First was the principle of academic self-government. 
According to this idea, faculties, comprised of 
professors under the chairmanship of a faculty-elected 
Dean, nominated qualified individuals to accept 
appointments for professorial positions and extended to 
them a certificate giving them the right to teach (venia 
legendi). This concept took the "appointing" power out 
of the hands of the state bureaucracy (Rodes, 1964; 
Maurois, 1966; Lilge, 1975).
Second was the principle of the "freedom of 
teaching" (Lehrfreiheit), which accorded to professors 
the right to teach their own convictions without 
hindrance from any other arena and to choose their own 
lecture subjects without having to follow a state- 
prescribed syllabus. Humboldt was concerned that
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government censorship and curriculum control would seduce 
men into a uniformity of opinion that would hamper their 
selection of a vocation and ultimately their self- 
realization. He was convinced that only if an individual 
were permitted to pursue that vocation, which would 
develop within him a love of work for its own sake, would 
his mind be cultivated and his character ennobled (Rodes, 
1964; Lilge, 1975; McClelland, 1980).
Finally, the principle of the "freedom of study" 
(Lernfreiheit), allowed a student to attend lectures of 
his choice as well as to migrate in his course work from 
university to university. Humboldt wanted the university 
to be a place where responsible self-education could 
occur. For him, the aim of education was the cultivation 
of human individuality. This could only happen in an 
atmosphere where the student was free to develop his 
personality as he wished, an idea that was in conflict 
with the state's desire to dictate the direction and 
utility of a student's development (Rodes, 1964; Maurois, 
1966; Lilge, 1975).
The Legitimization of Manipulation 
The state wanted to maintain control over the 
individual freedom that was basic to the nationalistic 
movement of the 1800s. The Ministry of Education
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repressed student unrest and divergent professorial 
political views through funding, through the appointment 
and firing process, and through increased scrutiny of 
student activities (Lilge, 1975).
The government was concerned with the turmoil on 
university campuses that was being brought about by 
students returning from the Napoleonic Wars with an 
increased sense of importance as well as an intense 
desire for German nationalism (McClelland, 1980). At the 
University of Berlin the education ministry asked the 
Rector to turn over the names of students who had 
participated in a meeting that the police had labeled as 
"foreboding of revolutionary chaos" (Lilge, 1975, 22).
In response to the state's reaction to student unrest, 
Ernst Moritz Arndt, a member of the faculty of the 
University of Bonn, published demands for greater freedom 
of expression for students (Kandel, 1935; 1975) .
Arndt's subsequent arrest by the state for having 
protested on behalf of the students brought complaints 
from the academic senates of both the Universities of 
Berlin and Bonn for what they termed as "arbitrary 
interferences with academic freedom" (Lilge, 1975, 23) . 
Although their objections were ignored, a willingness to 
confront the bureaucracy was developing among the 
professoriate. The ideology of nationalism was spreading
53
to the faculties of state universities (1975; McClelland, 
1980).
In the struggle to maintain their control over 
institutions of higher education, one "trump card" that 
the state repeatedly used was that of funding. 
Universities and their faculties had to depend for their 
financial support primarily upon the state. As a result, 
most of the professoriate felt obliged to support a 
system upon which they relied for the preservation of 
their economic interests (Kandel, 1935; Samuel and 
Thomas, 1971; bilge, 1975).
By the latter part of the 1800s, a situation 
developed that was significant in the state's continued 
effort to control the affairs of the university. 
Professorial academic freedom was once again the issue.
The Prussian Minister of Education, Freidrich Althoff, 
was not known as a supporter of the principles of 
academic freedom. He frequently filled vacancies on 
university faculties without conferring with other 
faculty members and was never hesitant about letting 
professors know of the risks they were running if their 
views did not align with Imperial policy (Craig, 1978; 
Gallin, 1986).
Upon discovering that Leo Arons, a young physics 
lecturer at the University of Berlin, was active in the
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Social Democratic party--a political group whose agenda 
was in opposition to that of the state, Althoff demanded 
that his venia legendi be withdrawn. The faculty senate 
refused to sanction Arons as there was no evidence that 
his political inclinations had any negative impact upon 
his teaching (Gallin, 1986; Craig, 1978). in the face of 
this rebuff, Althoff went over their heads and the 
Prussian government deprived Arons of his venia lecrendi 
by passing a new law stating that "the deliberate 
promotion of Social Democratic purposes is incompatible 
with a teaching post in a royal university" (Samuel and 
Thomas, 1971, 117).
The passage of "lex Arons" by the Prussian 
government was a direct infringement upon academic 
freedom. It encroached upon the authority of academic 
self-governance granted to the university; the faculty, 
not the state, was the body that bestowed the venia 
lecrendi upon qualified professors and lecturers and, 
thereby had the authority to sanction those who they 
determined had acted in an unprofessional manner. In 
spite of the attack upon academic freedom embodied in the 
passage of "lex Arons," many of the faculty were 
reluctant to go beyond mere criticism for fear that they 
would be putting their own careers in peril (Ringer,
1969; Samuel and Thomas, 1971; Craig, 1978). in contrast
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to this stance were the challenges brought to this arena 
by world renowned sociologist and scholar Max Weber.
Weber was angered by the acquiescence of some 
members of the professoriate to political pressures that 
gradually corrupted academic freedom (Shils, 1973). In a 
speech entitled, "The Alleged 'Academic Freedom' of the 
German Universities," Weber concluded with the following: 
... it should be required in the interest of good 
taste and truthfulness that henceforward we ought 
not to speak of the existence of 'the freedom of 
science and teaching' in Germany, as it has always 
been done. The fact is that the alleged academic 
freedom is obviously bound up with the espousal of 
certain views which are politically acceptable in 
court circles and in salons.... If it is, it should 
be honorably admitted, but we should not delude 
ourselves that we in Germany possess the same 
freedom of scientific and scholarly teaching which 
is taken for granted in [other] countries... {1973, 
17-18).
Weber believed that professors were too willing to 
conform their political views to those of the state. He 
was convinced that the German professoriate was deceiving 
itself if it thought, that by allowing the state to 
continue to dictate the parameters of academic freedom,
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it could avoid enfeebling the very prestige and 
scholarship it was laboring so hard to protect. Near the 
turn of the century, Robert Michels, a young scholar who 
had grown discouraged by the lengthy process he had to 
endure in seeking a professorial chair in Germany, 
accepted a teaching post in Italy. Weber pointed out 
that the delays Michels' encountered in the Prussian 
Ministry of Education were based upon officials' 
awareness of his support for a political agenda that was 
contrary to that of the state and not concerns related to 
his teaching qualifications. This manifestation of the 
ever-tightening governmental criteria for professorial 
conduct was interpreted by Weber as a manipulation of 
academic freedom (Lilge, 1975; Craig, 1978; McClelland, 
1980) . It was this manipulation that Weber believed 
would render the university "incapable of offering any 
resistance to public opinion or to the government because 
of the weakening of their moral authority" (1980, 269).
The Weimar Years 
This period in German history began with the 
conclusion of World War I and the signing of the peace 
treaty at Versailles in 1919 (Kagan et al., 1983). As 
designated by the Treaty, the German government was
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reestablished as a republic under a new constitution.
Most of the officials in this new Weimar Republic 
supported the Treaty of Versailles. These officials had 
alienated many of the professoriate by agreeing to a 
Treaty that forced Germany to succeed all of its overseas 
territories and to pay war reparations, both of which 
drained the same national treasury that was the source of 
professorial funding (Hasluck, 1938; Kelly, 1972).
The Republic, because it was implementing the 
stipulations of a Treaty that symbolized international 
resentment toward Germany, was seen by many university 
professors as representing the desires of the 
international community and not those of the German 
people {Kelly, 1972). The Weimar governments inability 
to maintain the professoriate's pre-World War I funding 
level along with the preferential treatment it gave to 
international interests diminished its sway over many 
university faculties (Hasluck, 1938) .
Another reason that the Weimar Republic was disliked 
by German professors was that many of its bureaucratic 
positions were filled by Jews. Most Germans believed 
that Jews were working within the Wiemar Republic because 
they held to the same internationalist views as did the 
government (Lilge, 1975; Craig, 1978). The resentment 
that was developing within many university faculties for
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Jews, who already held a disproportionate number of 
faculty positions in light of their numbers within the 
population, was deepened by the Republic's willingness to 
continue to fill some vacant faculty positions with 
Jewish candidates. These factors made it a simple matter 
to justify the anti-semitic bias generally held by the 
German professoriate (Kelly, 1972).
Such anti-semitism was apparent in the willingness 
of the faculty of the University of Munich to deny Hans 
Nawiasky, a Jewish professor of law at the university, 
his right to academic freedom. During the early 1930s, 
in one of his international law classes, Nawiasky stated 
that one sovereign state can legally establish power over 
another by means of a peace treaty, such as the Treaty of 
Versailles (Gay, 1968; Gallin, 1986). When his statement 
was challenged by angry gatherings of nationalistically 
motivated students, the university faculty did not 
support Nawiasky's right to make such a comment under the 
principle of Lehrfreiheit (Ringer, 1969; Grunberger,
1971) .
The professors were unable to see that, if 
Nawiasky's academic freedom could be questioned, their's 
could also be in jeopardy. The Nawiasky case illustrated 
that the German professoriate had undergone another 
drastic change. They had come to the point of being
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willing to delimit the academic freedom of one of their 
peers if they disapproved of his political beliefs or 
ethnic background (Gay, 1968; Ringer 1969; Grunberger, 
1971).
The Nazi Nexus 
When Adolph Hitler became the Chancellor of the 
Third Reich on January 30, 1933, he immediately called 
for the establishment of a totalitarian racial state. He 
did not want any individual to hold a state office if he 
was not of Aryan racial heritage or if he held political 
opinions contrary to those of the National Socialists 
(Kneller, 1941; Grunberger, 1971; Kelly, 1972).
With full knowledge of Hitler's commitment to this 
policy, a coalition of professors who held university 
chairs, signed and presented a manifesto to the 
citizenry, asking them to support Hitler's party in the 
March 1933 election. This professorial effort aided the 
National Socialists in gaining a majority in the 
Reichstag on election day (Bentwich, 1953; Beyerchen, 
1977). On April 7, 1933, the newly-elected Reichstag 
then passed Hitler's "Cleansing of the Civil Service 
Act." This law stated that: "Officials who are not of 
Aryan origin are to be dismissed...-Officials whose 
previous political activities do not offer the assurance
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that they will invariably and unreservedly support the 
National state must be dismissed (1953, 1)." This 
legislation meant that the National Socialist Party 
(Nazi) had created a totalitarian Aryan state that 
desired to control people--only the right people for 
membership, to control existing ideas--only the right 
knowledge, and finally, to control thinking--only the 
right political teachings (1953).
The civil Service Act legitimized Nazi removal of 
over 1200 scholars and scientists from the educational 
system (Van de Graaff, 1975; Bentwich, 1953). The 
majority of these scholars were either Jews or in 
sympathy with the Weimar internationalist agenda.
Many members of the German professoriate did not protest 
these dismissals since Jewish professors had been 
scapegoated partly due to the status of the job market.
The Jews, who constituted only one per cent of the entire 
German population, held one eighth of the professorial 
positions available in the universities. The Nazis and 
many professors found this situation to be intolerable as 
they felt that Jews had been given positions by the 
Weimar government that would have otherwise been 
available to "Aryan" Germans (Hartshorn, 1937; Jackman 
and Borden, 1983).
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In addition to professorial cooperation, the Nazis 
had the support of many university students. The Gentian 
Students Association participated in the campaign,
"Against the Un-German Spirit," a movement that was 
climaxed on May 10, 1933 by the public burning at the 
University of Berlin of over 20,000 books. These volumes 
had been singled out either because their content was 
unsympathetic to the Nazi cause or they had been authored 
by Jews {Kneller, 1941; Jackman and Borden, 1983). The 
May 10th destruction marked another instance when 
academic freedom had been delimited by political 
activists who determined that the accomplishment of their 
agenda was of greater significance than that of the 
"freedom of teaching" {Kandel, 1935; Hartshorn, 1937). 
Hitler had effectively begun to negate the essence of 
academic freedom in German universities.
Hitler's agenda was to implement ever-increasing 
degrees of governmental control over various aspects of 
academia. The first step had been the passage of the 
"Cleansing of the Civil Service Act" in 1933 whereby he 
took control over who did and did not teach. Although 
academic freedom provided for the appointment of new 
faculty members by nomination of professors and the 
election of Deans and rectors by the professoriate, this 
new law gutted the concept by eliminating certain groups
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from the nominating process for university teaching 
positions. The state was now solely responsible for 
determining who would and who would not teach in German 
universities (Ringer, 1969; Gallin, 1986).
Not satisfied with controlling "who" taught in the 
universities, the Nazi Party then moved to control "what" 
was taught. The "Law to Prevent Overcrowding of German 
Schools and Universities" was passed on April 26, 1933 
(Kelly, 1972; Gallin, 1986). It defined the mission of 
the universities as providing an education that would 
facilitate a student's ability to carry out the "national 
purpose." No longer were universities to be institutions 
dedicated to the ideal of scholarship, they were now 
carefully coordinated instruments of the state with the 
sole purpose of assisting in the attainment of national 
policy (Kandel, 1935; Samuel and Thomas, 1971). In 1935, 
the "Nuremberg Laws" gave even a broader scope to Nazi 
anti-semitic policy by calling for the dismissal of any 
teacher with a Jewish wife (Joughin, 1969). By 1938, 
according to the German newspaper, Frankfurter Zeitung. 
"one-third of the total teaching staffs of all 
universities had been retired or 'transferred'1 (1969,
131) .
Under Hitler's Reich, the professoriate was 
"cleansed" of any dissidents and became little more than
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an undisguised instrument of Nazi propaganda. Academic 
freedom was exterminated. The professoriate's abdication 
of its obligation to defend the freedom of its own along 
with the freedoms of its nation created an opportunity 
for leaders with their own agendas to infiltrate the 
university. Once these invaders took hold of the 
structures of academic freedom, it was too late for the 
professoriate to defend its sacred ground.
CHAPTER 5
THE EVOLUTION OF THE AMERICAN MODEL OF ACADEMIC FREEDOM
1700-1940
Introduction 
The evolution of the American model of academic 
freedom centered around the struggle of professors for 
intellectual liberty. They believed that their status as 
free men included the right not to conform their 
thoughts, lectures, or writings to any particular set of 
beliefs. Other groups however, in positions of authority 
in ecclesiastical, collegiate, political, and financial 
realms believed that their status entitled them to place 
limitations upon a professor's intellectual liberty.
This struggle was first manifested after the American 
Revolution.
After the Revolution 
With the end of the American Revolution in the 
1780s, the motivation for higher education in the United 
States became one of utility. The classically-based 
curriculum of the colonial college was suddenly being
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called upon to produce graduates who could lead this new 
nation into a period of remarkable discovery and 
expansion (French, 1964; Herbst, 1982) . Response to the 
call for a more utilitarian education led to the 
introduction of more professional chairs such as medicine 
and law to college faculties. This reaction to the 
demand for utility allowed for the expansion of the role 
of the professoriate in American higher education to that 
of assuming control over dynamic aspects of these newly 
formed professional schools. Professors, rather than 
boards and administrators, now had the authority to 
"announce standards of admission and performance and 
publicly confer honors for meritorious achievement"
(1982, 161). The professors became more involved in the 
innovative aspects of curriculum reform and were 
considered the experts and authorities in fields that 
were being acknowledged by boards and administrators as 
increasing in complexity.
The innovative academic programs that were being 
introduced into higher education brought with them a need 
for more funds, which required increased funding from 
state sources. With the need for more money came the 
willingness of administrators and board members to adopt 
the views of their legislative benefactors and to censor
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those professors who did not perpetuate the same beliefs 
(French, 1964; Portman, 1972).
One clear illustration of the influence that 
political agendas now had on academic affairs was the 
conflict between faculties and their boards that arose 
.around the question of slavery. There were professors 
with strong views on both sides of this issue. By the 
early 1800s, slavery had become both the touchstone for 
debate as well as the cornerstone for bias. If a 
professor made his views known on this issue and they 
were not in concordance with those of his college's board 
or president, the professor could be sanctioned in an 
administrative effort to maintain the college's 
supportive stance with governmental officials (Hofstadter 
and Metzger, 1955; Veysey, 1965). A professor's right to 
pursue and teach the truth was held hostage to the whims 
of partisan politics. He was still subject to reprisals 
by individuals in authority who viewed him, not as a 
"guardian" of intellectual verity, but as a "hawker" of 
factional interests.
The Impact of the German Model 
During the 1800s, approximately ten thousand 
American students matriculated in German universities.
Many of these scholars went to Germany because they were
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firmly convinced that the scholarship of American 
colleges was vastly inferior to that of universities such 
as Gottingen and Berlin. American ante-bellum colleges 
offered meager libraries and mediocre research 
facilities. To students seeking a more scholarly 
education, such deficiencies were only heightened when 
viewed with the possibility of pursuing their studies 
abroad at prestigious universities in the company of 
like-minded intellectuals (Thwing, 1928; Hofstadter and 
Metzger, 1955; Veysey, 1965).
While in Germany, these scholars were exposed to the 
concept of academic freedom and studied in universities 
where the principles of Lehrfreiheit. the freedom of 
teaching and inquiry, and Lernfreiheit. the freedom to 
learn had been put into practice. The intellectual 
liberty enjoyed by the German professoriate was an 
intoxicating phenomenon for many American scholars 
(Thwing, 1928; Hofstadter and Metzger, 1955; Veysey,
1965). The interpretation of the German professoriate's 
freedom as recounted by Edward Tyrrell Channing, a 
celebrated American professor of rhetoric, is reflective 
of the high esteem in which many American scholars held 
the liberty accorded their German professors:
The first (advantage] is an extreme freedom, and, as 
I should call it, latitudinarianism in thinking,
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speaking, writing, and teaching on all subjects, 
even law, religion, and politics... A  more perfect 
freedom, and in most cases a more perfect use and 
indulgence of it cannot be imagined than is now to 
be found in Germany; and nobody can read the books 
published, without observing their high abstract 
nature, and seeing that their free tone is derived 
almost, perhaps altogether, from the general 
character of the prevalent metaphysics (1928, 30- 
31) .
This atmosphere of "extreme freedom" perceived by 
American students as being allotted to German professors, 
whether in their lecture halls or in their writings, was 
assimilated into the educational philosophy of many of 
the returning scholars. Professor Paul Russell Pope of 
Cornell University concluded that, "more...than the 
concrete amassing of facts,.,[he] owed to German 
universities new intellectual...principles: A mind freed
from prejudices...free intellectually, free spiritually" 
(quoted in Thwing, 1928, 63). For these scholars, "it 
would [become] the assumption that academic freedom, like 
academic searching, defined the true university" 
(Hofstadter and Metzger, 1955, 393) . Having once studied 
in such an environment, many of these returning 
"professors-to-be" strove to impress upon the system of
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higher education in America the necessity of recognizing 
that one of the measures of the stature of a university 
was the extent of the liberties enjoyed by its 
professoriate (1928).
Upon returning to the United States in the latter 
part of the 1800s, these scholars took the German model 
of academic freedom and began to reshape it to fit 
colleges and universities in a democratic nation peopled 
with citizens who constitutionally were guaranteed the 
right to freedom of speech. It was this professorial 
demand for freedom of esqpression both inside and outside 
the walls of academia, i.e., the right of intra- and 
extra-mural utterance, that led to confrontations between 
professors and college presidents, boards of trustees and 
financial supporters (Thwing, 1928; Rudolph, 1962;
Veysey, 1965).
One instance where a professor's attempts to 
establish the right to extend academic freedom to include 
"extra-mural utterance" involved a conflict between 
Professor of Economics Edward A. Ross and Mrs. Leland 
Stanford. Professor Ross was dismissed from the Stanford 
faculty in 1900 after he had stated that he believed that 
municipal ownership of public transportation was 
preferable to its being controlled by big business 
interests. Such a position was diametrically opposed to
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that of the university's financial matriarch, Mrs. Leland 
Stanford, whose husband had made much of his fortune in 
the railroad business. She was convinced that Professor 
Ross could not "entertain such rabid ideas [about big 
business] without inculcating them in the minds of the 
students under his charge" (Hofstadter and Metzger, 1955, 
439) and that he could no longer be trusted to teach at 
the university (1955; Brubacher and Rudy, 1958; Veysey, 
1965; Joughin, 1969). A subsequent investigation into 
the "Ross Case" by the American Economic Association led 
to the conclusion that Professor Ross' dismissal by Mrs. 
Stanford had been substantially based upon his 
"utterances and beliefs" and that his right to extra­
mural utterance had been violated (1955, 445).
By the beginning of the 1900s, many professors felt 
that they still had no arena to which they could go to 
petition redress for what they considered to be 
infringements upon their right to academic freedom. It 
was this frustration and uncertainty within the ranks of 
the American professoriate that led to the founding of 
the American Association of University Professors in 
1915, an organization devoted to the protection of the 
academic freedom of university and college professors 
(Hofstadter and Metzger, 1955; Brubacher and Rudy, 1958).
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The American Association of University Professors 
In response to the futility and apprehension voiced 
by its membership, the Committee on Academic Freedom and 
Academic Tenure of the American Association of University 
Professors presented, during its first year, the 1915 
Declaration of Principles. This document contained the 
following statement:
It is better for students to think about heresies 
than not to think at all; better for them to climb 
new trails, and stumble over error if need be, than 
to ride forever in upholstered ease in the 
overcrowded highway. It is a primary duty of a 
teacher to make a student take an honest account of 
his stock of ideas, throw out the dead matter, place 
revised price marks on what is left, and try to fill
his empty shelves with new goods (as quoted in
Joughin, 1969, 171).
Professors wanted the freedom to teach their 
students how to critically assess new ideas so that they 
could determine which should be accepted and how to 
critique old concepts so that they could calculate which 
should be discarded. They considered that it was their 
obligation or purpose to "inquire into the validity of 
all beliefs and [to] search for new perspectives and •
fresh knowledge" (Henderson and Henderson, 1975, 170) .
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They were determined to hold fast to this purpose even 
though their tenacity frequently set them at odds with 
groups in and out of the institutions of higher education 
at which they taught (1975).
College presidents and boards of trustees were two 
such groups. Many believed that professors whose 
lectures or writings did not support the institution's 
agenda would be working at cross-purposes with the goals 
of that college or university. They were concerned that 
allowing professors to voice such "contrary1 opinions 
could possibly even divert potential financial 
benefactors and political supporters of the institution 
(Hofstadter and Metzger, 1955).
In spite of the united front against academic 
freedom that was initially presented by college 
presidents and boards of trustees, many members of the 
professoriate were determined not to acquiesce to 
attempts to infringe upon their rights. Professors 
believed that, in order to adequately explore new 
horizons of truth, they must continue to press for the 
dimensions of intra- and extra-mural utterance that was 
supported by the AAUP. Its Committee's report stated 
that "... teachers should be exempt from all restraints as 
to the matter or manner of their utterances, either 
within or without the university" (as quoted in Joughin,
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1969, 173.) The AAUP had taken a firm stand against 
attempts to muzzle a professor's voicing of his views 
beyond the confines of the institution of higher 
education of which he was a member. Any concern that a 
college president or board might have that potential 
financial benefactors, or political allies could in some 
way be offended by a professor's pronouncement of his 
views did not move the AAUP from its position as an 
advocate for this tenet of academic freedom (Alberty and 
Bode, 1938; Karier, 1986). The AAUP was able to 
successfully press institutions of higher education to 
accept its agenda. It did so through the negative 
publicity produced by its formal censuring of any college 
or university that had violated a professor's academic 
freedom. What made AAUP censuring such a powerful tool, 
so powerful in fact that colleges and universities often 
voluntarily changed their policies to conform to AAUP 
guidelines, was that it played upon the same fear of 
unfavorable public opinion that was often the impetus 
behind attempts to muzzle faculty members {Baade, 1964; 
French, 1964).
The Impact of War 
The entrance of the United States into World War I 
in 1917 set the stage for a conflict that tested the
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resolve of those professors who supported the tenets of 
the 1915 Declaration and those boards and administrators 
who saw the need to position their institutions as 
supporters of nationalistic policies. The primary issue 
of concern was whether or not it was legitimate to place 
limits upon a professor's individual freedom during a 
time of extreme national emergency. In other words, was 
it appropriate to ask members of the professoriate to 
keep silent about their positions on sensitive issues 
(Beard and Beard, 1930; Brubacher and Rudy, 1958; 
Finkelstein, 1984).
In response to this conflict, the AAUP appointed a 
committee on Academic Freedom in Wartime. Their report 
supported the view that war brought with it the need to 
place some restrictions upon the liberty of university 
professors in reference to the "rights and obligations of 
free speech" (Report, 1918, 29). The committee did say, 
however, that no more restraints should be placed upon 
university professors than were put upon other citizens. 
Its report states that university professors "should be 
subject to the inhibitions which, because of the 
exigencies of war, the government may enjoin upon all 
citizens alike, and to those inhibitions alone" (1918,
33) .
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The fact that the AAUP supported any limitations 
upon the civil liberties of professors seemed to some 
members of the professoriate to be in direct 
contradiction of their endorsement of professorial 
freedom of speech stated in the 1915 Declaration.
Although the members of the committee did have some 
supporters among the AAUP membership, they were depicted 
in some corners as having surrendered that high ground 
which had so eloquently been captured in 1915 (Bentwich, 
1953; Hofstadter and Metzger, 1955). An article in The 
Nation went so far as to say that "The Committee...had 
handed over the keys of the castle to the enemy" (1955, 
504) .
In spite of the disappointment that surrounded the 
Report of the Committee on Academic Freedom in Wartime, 
the AAUP's 1915 Declaration still served for almost a 
decade as a basis for the Association's investigations 
into alleged infringements upon professorial academic 
freedom. By 1925, however, it had become apparent to 
those working on such investigations that the case load 
was increasing beyond the ability of the AAUP to 
adequately investigate. As a result, in 1925 several 
national educational societies such as the Association of 
University Women, American Association of University 
Professors, Association of Governing Boards, Association
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of Land Grant Colleges, Association of Urban 
Universities, National Association of State Universities, 
and the American Council on Education met together with 
the intent of coming up with a joint statement on 
academic freedom. After considerable debate, the 
Conference adopted the 1925 Statement on Academic Freedom 
and Tenure. The primary accomplishment of this new 
statement was its having been adopted by several 
educational organizations that would result in a broader 
base of support for the tenets of academic freedom as 
well as an increase in the number of arenas where 
professors could go to voice their grievances (Alberty 
and Bode, 1938; Bentwich, 1953).
Professorial Persistence 
Efforts to ensure that the American model of 
academic freedom would be the standard for intellectual 
freedom in institutions of higher education throughout 
the country met another roadblock less than ten years 
after the adoption of the 1925 Statement of Principles. 
This time the issue was teacher loyalty oath legislation. 
The Stock Market Crash of 1929 had led the way to the 
Great Depression; American institutions of higher 
education were not exempt from the severe economic 
realities of the period. In addition to the short supply
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of funds during the 1930s, there also was a wave of anti­
communist fever sweeping the country. Being connected, 
even indirectly, to individuals who supported communism 
brought immediate criticism from the public. As a result 
of these two perspectives, many college presidents and 
boards of trustees were deeply concerned. They feared 
that having members of their faculties voicing views that 
were not clearly nationalistic and claiming protection 
under the umbrella afforded by academic freedom could 
lead to the demise of their institutions since it could 
result in lessened government and private financial 
support as well as lowered enrollment figures. Adding to 
this pressure being exerted upon those professors whose 
views were being questioned was the passage of teacher 
loyalty legislation in over twenty states. Legislators 
were reluctant to fund educational institutions whose 
faculty members held views they considered to be in 
sympathy with communism. These concerns made them 
willing to vote in favor of loyalty oaths (Knight and 
Hall, 1951).
A professor's right to the unhindered pursuit and 
expression of the truth was once again being questioned. 
The 1937 Statement of Committee B of the AAUP interpreted 
the movement for loyalty oaths as "a manifestation of an 
essentially un-American temper...[and] the insidious
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beginning of a movement hostile to what is best and most 
fundamental in our political principles and our national 
ideals" (Conference, 1937, 32). They contended that such 
oaths would constitute an unwarranted limitation of 
academic freedom as "the statute's intent was to cause 
professors to refrain from criticizing or suggesting 
changes in the fundamental law of the country" (Alberty 
and Bode, 1938, 323).
Reflective of the existence across academia of 
support for the AAUP's stand against such legislation was 
an article written by Judge Ogden L. Mills, "A Harvard 
Man on Academic Freedom," that was published in the 
University of Chicago Magazine. The Honorable Judge 
Mills wrote:
That [a professor's] views do not coincide with 
those of a governing board...may be unfortunate, but 
to ask him to remain silent unless his opinions 
conform to theirs, would be to limit his right as a 
citizen, to deprive him of part of his liberty and 
to impose humiliating restrictions unacceptable to 
independent and high-minded men. Any university 
attempting to enforce such a censorship would soon 
cease to attract preeminent men who combine 
independence of mind with sound scholarship, the
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very men who bring it strength and vitality (Alberty
and Bode, 1938, 153).
Judge Mills' perspective not only underscores the fact 
that professors are citizens and, as such, are entitled 
to the right of free speech--he also focuses in on 
another very important point, that institutions 
supportive of such measures would likely be unable to 
attract individuals with the level of scholarship so 
necessary to the survival of any college or university.
That these points were understood by some college 
presidents is made clear in an article written in 1938 by 
Alexander Meiklejohn, the President of Amherst. He comes 
out in full support of the maintenance of academic 
freedom not only as a professorial right but also as a 
necessary policy decision for those institutions that 
wanted to maintain high levels of scholarship. He argued 
that the intellectual welfare of the people is placed in 
jeopardy when the freedom to deal with controversial 
issues by that nation's professoriate is in any way 
hindered. Furthermore, he explained that "the health and 
effectiveness of our national education depend upon our 
keeping it in active touch with the fundamental 
controversies of our society" (Meiklejohn, 1938, 22). He 
firmly believed, as did Judge Mills, that teachers must 
be permitted to discuss controversial issues and that in
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that liberty lay not only the welfare of truth but also 
that of higher education.
The controversy surrounding teacher loyalty 
legislation persuaded the membership of the AAUP to 
formulate their 1940 statement of Principles and 
Interpretive Comments on Academic Freedom and Tenure.
This document became the most widely known and endorsed 
statement of academic freedom in the United States (Poch, 
1993). The process of its formulation began in 1934 when 
the American Association of Colleges, which was formed by 
college presidents largely out of a desire to establish 
an organization that would be as helpful in pressing 
their agenda as the AAUP had been in furthering that of 
professors, and the American Association of University 
Professors began a series of joint conferences on the 
most expedient and beneficial means whereby to implement 
the principles of academic freedom in institutions of 
higher education. The end result of these meetings was 
the aforementioned statement, which presented as its 
fundamental purpose to "...promote public understanding 
and support of academic freedom and tenure and an 
agreement upon procedures to assure them in colleges and 
universities" (Joughin, 1969, 2). Included in those 
procedures was a delineation of four particular arenas in 
which the professoriate were to be entitled to an
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unhindered pursuit of the truth: research, publication
of research findings, lecturing, and intra- and extra­
mural communication (1993, 11).
The value and import of the 1940 Statement was not 
reflected solely in the principles of academic freedom 
and tenure that were once again presented in it, even 
though the need for such a re-articulation was necessary 
if for no other reason than there had been repeated 
attempts to limit those principles. Instead, its very 
existence stands as a testimony to the unwavering 
commitment of members of the American professoriate to 
refuse to relinquish any of their Constitutionally- 
guaranteed rights merely because they had chosen to be 
educators; that, although being part of the teaching 
profession carries with it considerable privileges, those 
privileges are counterbalanced by an equally considerable 
number of responsibilities to the society in which those 
privileges are resident.
CHAPTER 6
THE EVALUATION OF THE INFLUENCE OF ACADEMIC FREEDOM 
IN GERMANY AND AMERICA 
UPON THE CAREERS OF FOUR SCIENTISTS
Introduction 
An essential component in a system of higher 
education is the professoriate. In order for there to be 
a transmission of the knowledge contained in university 
libraries, research institutes, and programs of study, 
colleges or universities must be comprised of faculties 
who can successfully convey such information to students. 
As the professoriate plays a fundamental role in this 
process, the presence or absence of academic freedom 
influences the ability to transmit truth. The political 
climate in which the professoriate functions acts as 
either a catalyst for or deterrent to the exercise of 
this academic freedom.
The Legislative Onslaught 
On January 30, 1933, Adolph Hitler took office as 
the Chancellor of Germany; this position in the German 
Reich afforded him the electoral power that he needed to
82
83
carry out his political agenda (Franklin, 1981). Two 
months later, he addressed a letter to German President 
Paul von Hindehburg expressing the rational behind his 
impending legislative assault against the Jews, whose 
presence within Germany he was determined to remove (Tal, 
1982).
Hitler believed that the Jewish influence in the 
academic arenas of "law, medicine, and the like" (Tal, 
1982, 5), was detrimental to the German nation and that 
it had to be ended. His letter to von Hindenburg
contained his three reasons for this contention. First,
he was convinced that, in light of the percentage of Jews
in the German population, their disproportionate
representation in positions of authority and 
responsibility in the government kept "disadvantaged, 
true Germans" out of work (1982).
Second, Hitler considered the Jews to be a "foreign 
body" (Tal, 1982, 5) with enough economic leverage in 
Germany to sabotage any of his efforts to cure the 
economy, the society, and the state. Third, he firmly 
believed that the Jews could not be trusted to support 
the foreign and domestic policies of the Reich (Kevles, 
1978; 1982).
Hitler's anti-semitism was based upon what he 
considered to be a competition for living space and
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national dominance. He believed that the Jews were 
members of a separate nation, not individuals who could 
be citizens of any nation-state. He further considered 
Jews as comprising a corporate entity grappling for 
domination of a foreign nation (Kevles, 1978; Gordon, 
1984). Therefore, according to Hitler's concept of 
national sovereignty, every nation comprised of an 
indigenous "race" had to fight to maintain its own living 
space. As long as Jews remained in any nation, they 
threatened "the political, military, economic, cultural, 
and racial strength of those nations among whom they were 
dispersed" (1984, 95).
Accordingly, Hitler felt that if this internal 
struggle between Jew and non-Jew were permitted to 
continue, his country might loose its pre-ordained 
geographical position in history. As Hitler was 
determined that Germany would achieve the world 
domination for which he believed it was pre-destined, he 
considered it a political necessity for him to remove all 
Jews, both within Germany's own borders and within every 
nation that it annexed (Proctor, 1988).
Hitler focused upon the Jewish professors primarily 
because of his concern that they would spread their 
"Jewishness" by contaminating those students who would be 
the future leaders of nationalistic Germany. He was
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determined to use the universities as a tool for the 
advancement of his own political agenda (Jackman and 
Borden, 1983). In revitalizing the German spirit, Hitler 
first assaulted academic freedom. He believed that only 
through a conquest over and control of the intellectual 
freedom of the professoriate would the goals of the 
government, "honor to the Fatherland and restoration of 
Germanic lands to the Reich" (Gallin, 1986, 87) be 
attained.
Within two months after becoming Chancellor, Hitler 
began his legislative attack against the Jewish members 
of the civil service, which included university 
professors. His first move was to introduce the Law for 
the Re-establishment of the Professional Civil Service to 
the German Reichstag (Tal, 1982; Gallin, 1986).
This law was aimed at removing Jewish or non-Aryan 
(according to Nazi doctrine, individuals whose parents or 
grand-parents were Jewish Caucasians) employees from the 
civil service. Specifically, the law stipulated that 
non-Aryan professors were to be retired and that non­
tenured, non-Aryan professors were to be dismissed. In 
addition, it revoked the "eligibility for citizenship" 
status of all Jewish faculty who had become naturalized 
citizens after November, 1918. In order to accept a 
faculty chair at a state university, professors, if they
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held foreign citizenship, had to become naturalized 
citizens of Germany. Therefore, this legislation not 
only meant the loss of a faculty position, it also meant 
the loss of German citizenship (Hartshorne, 1937; Jackman 
and Borden, 1983).
The Law for the Re-establishment of the Professional 
Civil Service had within it several exemptions. First, 
its restrictions did not apply to individuals who had 
been employed by the state during World War I. This 
meant that those Jews who were university professors 
during World War I would not be dismissed. Second, 
persons who themselves had fought on the front lines or 
who had had a father or son killed in World War I were 
excluded from dismissal from their government positions. 
This was due, in part, to Hitler's desire to appease 
those members of the Reichstag who would feel comradeship 
with World War I veterans. These exemptions did not last 
long, however (Beyerchen, 1977; Tal, 1982).
Between 1933 and 1939, the few exemptions allowed by 
this law were systematically eliminated by German courts 
and legislatures through the passage of some 400 pieces 
of anti-semitic legislation (Weinberg, 1986). The most 
famous of these statutes were the series of Nuremberg 
Laws passed in 1935. These laws were used to further 
cleanse the German population of unwanted, non-Aryan,
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elements. One of these laws stipulated that if an Aryan 
professor had a Jewish wife, he would be dismissed 
because intimacy with a Jew would taint his Aryan nature. 
Another Nuremberg Law was the Reich Citizenship Law of 
September 15, which served to delineate the difference 
between individuals who were citizens and those who were 
residents. A citizen was defined as a person of pure 
Aryan blood who was willing and able to serve the German 
people and nation. A resident was defined as anyone of 
non-Aryan blood, including all Jews, who were, 
conversely, not eligible to serve the German people and 
nation (Proctor, 1988; Muller, 1991).
A third piece of Nuremberg legislation was the Law 
for the Protection of German Blood and German Honor. It 
forbade marriage and sexual relations between Jews and 
non-Jews. This Blood Protection Law specified which 
groups could intermarry. It also forbade Jews from 
employing German servants under the age of 45. The 
intent of this latter stipulation was that no German 
would be in a position of “taking orders" from a Jew.
The final Nuremberg Law, passed a month later, on October 
18, was the Law for the Protection of the Genetic Health 
of the German People (Proctor, 1988; Muller, 1991).
Since Jews were considered to be genetically inferior to 
Aryans, it required Jewish couples to be examined before
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marriage in order to determine if they might pass on any 
"racial damage" that was believed to be inherent among 
Jews (1988, 132).
Collectively, all of these laws segregated the 
Jewish professor from his fellow countrymen. No longer 
was he a citizen, he was a resident. No longer was he a 
teacher in search of the truth, he was classified as a 
dispenser of anti-German propaganda. No longer was he a 
researcher who shared his findings with his students, he 
was now considered an alien without a country, and 
relegated to being an inquirer without a laboratory, and 
a teacher without a lecture hall. He represented racial 
pollution rather than scholastic purity. He was anathema 
to all he held sacred in academia.
The Adulteration of German Science
The Civil Service Laws as well as the Nuremberg 
Legislation of the 1930s both had a devastating effect 
upon the universities of Germany and the academic freedom 
of their professoriate. For the government to stipulate 
Aryanism as a criterion for professorial appointments was 
a violation of the principle of academic self-government. 
No longer was a candidate for a university position 
accepted or rejected by the faculty based upon his 
teaching ability and his competency in his subject area.
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Instead, racial purity and political adherence to Nazi 
policy had become the determining factors (Hartshorne, 
1937; Rodes, 1964; Lilge, 1975).
Scientific work in Germany was severely limited by 
these legislative measures, since they served to restrict 
the output of institutions of higher education by 
hobbling the intellectual freedom of the professoriate. 
Particularly desolated were those institutions of higher 
education that were involved in scientific research. 
Between the years 1933 and 1935, approximately 1,150 non- 
Aryan scientists were dismissed or forced to retire.
Among these were many illustrious scholars, several of 
whom had either already won the Nobel Prize or would soon 
achieve laureate status (Hartshorne, 1937; Beyerchen,
1977; Nachmansohn, 1979).
Professor David Hilbert, who was a member of the 
faculty of the famous Mathematics and Physics Department 
of the University of Gottingen lamented as to the 
destruction that "racial purity" had brought to the 
University's science departments. When in a meeting in 
1934 the Nazi Minister of Science, Education and Popular 
Culture, Bernhard Rust, asked Hilbert about the faculty. 
Reflecting on the catastrophic impact of Hitler's 
policies, Hilbert responded, "[The faculty] just does not
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exist....It was destroyed when its most illustrious 
leaders were simply chased away" {Nachmansohn, 1979, 45).
The Kaiser Wilhelm Institute of Physics also 
suffered a terrible blow. Of its highly qualified 
scientists, a quarter were either dismissed or retired 
due to the stipulations of the Civil Service Act. The 
departure of so many exceptional faculty without 
consultation with other members of the professoriate was 
a violation of the principle of Lehrfreiheit. This mass 
exodus left the Institute without the leadership 
necessary to give it the direction it required. As a 
result, the Nazi Ministry of Education had the 
opportunity to slowly redefine the course of German 
science. No longer was "theoretical" science the star in 
the academic crown of the German university; instead, 
science was limited to practical applications (Bentwich, 
1953; Van de Graaff, 1975). The new Reich neither valued 
nor condoned the long-term, theoretical approach to 
German science that had been the mark of "Jewish" 
professors. Instead, it wanted a science that would 
provide short-term, practical solutions for problems in 
industry, agriculture, and defense {Kevles, 1978; 
Nachmansohn, 1979).
Positions formerly occupied by elite theoretical 
scientists were now filled by men who were more concerned
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with the furtherance of Nazi ideology and practical 
advancements than with the elevation of German science 
(Muller, 1991). The Minister of Education promoted into 
positions of leadership two strongly anti-semitic, Nobel 
Prize-winning physicists, Johannes Stark and Philip 
Lenard. Both of these men were committed to replacing 
irrelevant "Jewish" theory with sound "German" 
practicality. Stark and Lenard even opposed the 
distinguished German Physical Society solely because they 
considered it to have been dominated by Jews. As German 
scientists, more importantly as "Nazi German" scientists, 
they were convinced that adhering to the politically- 
motivated criteria of the Nazi agenda instead of to the 
standards of the international scientific community was 
an appropriate academic measure for determining the worth 
of a specific line of research as well as the value of a 
particular researcher (Nachmansohn, 1979; Macrakis,
1993) . Lenard, who made no effort to hide his anti- 
semitic feelings, even had the following notice posted on 
his office door: "Entrance to Jews and Members of the
German Physical Society Not Permitted" (1979, 119).
The intellectual freedom of the German professor was 
systematically annihilated through the unrelenting 
political onslaught of the Nazi Party. Hitler had made 
his first assault on the spirit of free inquiry within
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the German university. In addition to segregation and 
relegation to second-class residents/ Jewish members of 
the professoriate were no longer free to pursue 
theoretical innovation. As a result, four elite 
scientists had to struggle to find their response.
Albert Einstein in Germany
The career of Albert Einstein before his emigration 
from the threats of Nazism reveals the unfolding of a 
pattern of intolerance. His career decisions reflected 
an awareness that his ideologies were in conflict with 
those of his German Aryan colleagues as well as with 
those of officials of the Third Reich. As early as 1921, 
Einstein determined that both his political and 
scientific ideas would eventually separate him from his 
homeland (French, 1979; Jackman and Borden, 1983).
In June, 1921, Einstein commented to Philipp Frank, 
a theoretical physicist and close personal friend 
(French, 1979) that, "I am not likely to remain in 
Germany longer than another ten years" (Jackman and 
Borden, 1983, 174). Einstein had determined the early 
signs of a rising provincial and narrow-minded attitude 
among his fellow intellectuals in the German universities 
(1979; 1983). His ideas had already begun to cause a 
rift between him and his colleagues.
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He and George Nicolai, a professor of physiology at 
the University of Berlin, had just co-authored the 
"Manifesto to Europeans" (Clark, 1984, 228). In this 
document, Einstein and Nicolai presented their 
internationalist and pacifist ideology. Their 
"Manifesto" was written as a rebuttal to the 
nationalistic ideology of the widely-circulated 
"Manifesto to the Civilized World," this document, 
written by some and endorsed by most of his colleagues, 
exonerated Germany from guilt for starting World War I 
(Franklin, 1981; 1984).
In his "Manifesto," Einstein pointed out that such 
extremely nationalistic attitudes were a detriment to the 
cultural cooperation that scholars in every country 
should support. He believed that, if men of science 
condoned war, they were doing so to their detriment. The 
volatile environment that was created by conflict would 
only serve to undermine international collaboration 
necessary for research (Nachmansohn, 1979; Macrakis,
1993) .
Einstein was convinced that research could not 
attain its highest level unless a political environment 
existed where scholars from different countries could 
share with one another. This conflicted with the 
nationalistic ideas of his colleagues who saw the
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emergence of Germany as being linked to the emergence of 
the superiority of the German mind. Clearly, Einstein's 
academic anchor was the world; for many of his 
colleagues, it was Germany (Clark, 1984) .
After Einstein's and Nicolai's document was 
circulated among the other members of the professoriate 
at the University of Berlin, only two signatures were 
added. Most of Einstein's colleagues found his 
"Manifesto" to be traitorous, particularly since it 
criticized Germany's actions during World War I 
(Franklin, 1981). This overwhelming refutation of his 
internationalist-pacifist agenda was representative of 
the schism that existed between this world-renowned 
scientist and many of his fellow professors (Clark,
1984). In an arena where a tolerance for the ideas of 
others was intended to serve as a guiding force in 
professorial relations, he faced a professoriate that was 
increasingly open in their antagonism toward his beliefs 
(Weinberg, 1986).
In acknowledgement of his inability to garner 
support for his ideas among members of the professoriate, 
Einstein reluctantly joined the political party, Bund 
Neues Vaterland. He was convinced that the only solution 
to the world's problems lay in a substantial surrender of 
autonomy by individual countries and governments (French,
95
1979). Bund neuea Vaterland had as its primary political 
objective the establishment of an international 
diplomatic body, which through peaceful arbitration, 
would make future wars impossible (Clark, 1984). His 
association with this organization was but the laying of 
another symbolic brick in the wall that was separating 
him from the majority of the German academic community.
Einstein ignited even more animosity with members of 
the German professoriate by making several trips to the 
United States during the 1920's. His colleagues were 
angered by his willingness to share his scientific 
knowledge with "the enemy" that had just defeated Germany 
in World War X. He added even more fuel to their anger 
and intolerance by spending time during these trips 
raising money to help build a Jewish university in 
Jerusalem (Jackman and Borden, 1983; Clark, 1984).
As these events and issues unfolded, Einstein began 
to change his political views. Previously, his 
connection to international Jewry had always been based 
upon the "pursuit of knowledge for its own sake, an 
almost fanatical love of justice and the desire for 
personal independence" (French, 1979, 201). These 
beliefs and values were the features of the Jewish 
tradition that had made Einstein grateful to be a Jew 
(1979). He had not seen the need for all Jews to be
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united geographically, for he had always believed that it 
would be through cultural assimilation that the Jew would 
eventually find his "homeland.” However, with the 
increasing nationalistic bias of the German professoriate 
and the onslaught of Nazi anti-semitism, Einstein began 
to realize that the preservation of the Jew could only 
occur with the establishment of a Jewish state. Einstein 
was becoming a Zionist (Bentwich, 1953; 1979; Clark,
1984).
In April, 1933, when the Law for the Re­
establishment of Professional Civil Service was passed, 
Albert Einstein was the Director of Theoretical Physics 
in the Kaiser Wilhelm institute. Having held this 
position since 1914, he was exempted from dismissal. 
However, there was little doubt that he would have been 
dismissed under the "politically unreliable" clause of 
that same piece of legislation. This clause stated that 
any individual who could not be counted upon to adhere 
completely to the National Socialist Party philosophy 
would be considered "politically unreliable" an therefore 
subject to dismissal. In any case, Einstein, realizing 
the true intent of the law was to ensure "cleansing," and 
recognizing the loss of intellectual liberty that it 
would bring, submitted his resignation from the
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Directorship of the Institute of Theoretical Physics 
(Beyerchen, 1977; Kevles, 1978).
A few of Einstein's colleagues were willing to 
openly risk questioning his treatment by the Nazis. One 
such individual was Dr. Max von Laue, a distinguished 
German physicist. He reminded the May, 1933 meeting of 
the Kaiser Wilhelm Society that the determination by the 
Ministry of Education that Einstein's research was 
valueless and that his books were traitorous had been 
carried out without the government office having 
consulted even one member of the Institute's 
professoriate. Von Laue then called upon the Society to 
raise objections to their exclusion from the Ministry's 
deliberations, as it was a violation of their right to 
academic self-government. The majority of the membership 
of the Society, however, voted to support the actions of 
the Ministry's Secretary (Kelly, 1972; Beyerchen, 1977; 
Macrakis, 1993).
The Society's scholars overrode Einstein's right to 
academic freedom by sustaining the Ministry of 
Education's decision to debase the content of his 
research based upon their intolerance for his pacifism, 
internationalism, and non-Aryanism. In so doing, they 
jeopardized their right to academic self-government 
(Gallin, 1986; Macrakis, 1993). As a result, they
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"betrayed their own freedom and prepared the way for a 
totalitarianism that would overwhelm [German academia]" 
(1986, 70).
In addition, Einstein also resigned from the 
Prussian Academy of Sciences. Here, too, a lack of 
tolerance for his political viewpoint and his racial 
heritage reigned. Upon receipt of Einstein's 
resignation, the Academy informed him that "he had let 
himself be used by opponents not only of the new German 
government, but of the German people as a whole" 
(Beyerchen, 1977, 41). The Academy stated that 
Einstein's position as a supporter of the enemies of the 
German Reich was "a bitter, painful disappointment for 
us, which would probably have necessitated a parting of 
the ways even if we had not received your resignation" 
(1977, 41).
In response to this resignation, Professor Max 
Planck, a Nobel Laureate and member of the Prussian 
Academy of Sciences, addressed a session of the Academy 
on May 11, 1933, the day after Einstein's books had been 
among those publicly burned at the University of Berlin 
because of their "un-German" spirit. He compared 
Einstein's greatness to that of Kepler and Newton, and 
stressed that he hoped posterity would not speak ill of 
the Academy for not recognizing Einstein as a great
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thinker nor perceiving his significance to science. 
However, Planck, being known as having adopted "an 
attitude of prudential acquiescence and delaying tactics" 
(Wistrich, 1982) balanced his comments by concluding that 
Einstein's politics made it impossible for the Academy to 
retain him (Beyerchen, 1977).
Planck's straddling of the fence, his attempt at 
balancing his support for Einstein with his support for 
Nazi policy, became the model for the compromising 
position taken by many in the German professoriate during 
the initial stages of academic cleansing by the National 
Socialists. This stance stood as a direct assault 
against the bulwark of academic freedom. By choosing 
what appeared to be a compromise, the rights of others 
could be placed in the balance between what was right and 
what was expedient (Kelly, 1972; Beyerchen, 1977; Gallin, 
1986).
When the 1933 Civil Service Act was passed by the 
Reichstag. Einstein was out of the country. After 
resigning from both professional positions, he also 
decided to renounce his German citizenship. This man, 
who had won the Nobel Prize in 1921, who had become an 
internationally respected and honored scientist, and who 
had desired only to see science--and in particular,
German science--prosper, had reached a point where German
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citizenship had become, for him, "a strange affair"
(Clark, 1984, 564). His life of allegiance to Germany 
had been fraught with repeated instances of political and 
racial intolerance. Although Nazi persecution of the 
Jews had moved Einstein to become a Zionist, he still 
believed that, personally, as "an internationally-minded 
man, citizenship of a specific country was not important; 
[rather] humanity is more important than national 
citizenship" (1984, 564). With thiB thought in mind, 
Einstein formally surrendered his right to full German 
citizenship at the German Embassy in Brussels. Upon 
exiting the Embassy, Einstein "left German territory for 
the last time" (1984, 565).
James Pranck in Germany 
James Franck, a distinguished German physicist who 
received the Nobel Prize in 1925 (Candee, 1957), was a 
man content to spend his entire life working within the 
halls of academia. He, like so many of his close 
colleagues, felt the world of politics was something that 
should remain at a distance from the university. All of 
this changed for Franck when, as a matter of principle, 
he made a solitary public protest in opposition to the 
policies of the Nazi Party (Gallin, 1986; Macrakis,
1993) .
101
In 1921, Franck was offered the chair of the Second 
Institute of Physics at the University of Gottingen.
This, for him, was an ideal position. He was able to 
direct his research according to his own interests and to 
establish close contacts with the students within his 
department. Such informal relationships were a rare 
feature at German universities, where formality generally 
prevailed in the communication between professors and 
students (Nachmansohn, 1979; Macrakis, 1993).
By the 1930s, Franck was the leading experimental 
physicist in Germany. His accomplishments elevated the 
department at Gottingen and led to its being christened 
the "Mecca of Atomic Physics" (Wistrich, 1984, 78). In 
1932, he was the foremost candidate for the chair of 
physics at the University of Berlin. He was unable to 
accept this position, at this high point in his career, 
because of the implementation of the 1933 Civil Service 
Law (Nachmansohn, 1979).
The University of Gottingen suffered greatly from 
the impact of this legislation. Within the faculty of 
physics, in addition to Franck, a number of other 
brilliant Jews held prominent positions. Upon 
notification of the Civil Service Law's passage, these 
men joined Franck in extensive discussions as how to best
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respond to the racist elements of the new law (Bentwich, 
1953; Beyerchen, 1977).
Franck, who had been a highly-decorated German 
veteran of World War I, was exempt from dismissal 
(Bentwich, 1953) . His ethical dilemma was whether or not 
he should retain his position when other Jews would have 
to lose theirs (Beyerchen, 1977). The principle at stake 
was one of academic freedom, in that, by keeping his 
position, Franck would be acknowledging and supporting 
the right of governmental policy to stipulate who could 
or could not teach within the university. Franck 
concluded that, despite his exempted status, he would 
have to resign. He knew that he could not obey a law 
that required him to dismiss colleagues on the basis of a 
racial heritage that he shared. Franck became even more 
resolute in his decision as he watched the manipulation 
of the Nazi-dominated student leadership and witnessed 
the response of the professoriate to their actions 
(Kelly, 1972; Gallin, 1986).
Where once Franck had brought students together to 
pursue truth from many sources, the government now 
dictated truth under the guise of ideological purity. At 
the direction of Joseph Goebbels of the newly formed 
Reich Ministry for the Enlightenment of the Volk and 
Propaganda, the German Minister of Education re-
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established student self-government, which had been 
removed during the Weimar years (Bentwich, 1953; Kelly, 
1972; Gallin, 1986). On April 13, this newly formed 
student government association announced its campaign 
"against the Un-German Spirit" (Beyerchen, 1977, 16). 
Within its twelve-point declaration was a pronouncement 
that:
The Jew can only think Jewish, and when he writes in 
German, he is lying; students should view Jews as 
aliens, and Jewish works should appear in Hebrew, or 
at least be designated as 'translations' if they 
were printed in German; students and professors 
should be selected according to their guarantee of 
thinking in the German Spirit (1977, 16).
The German student movement further manifested its 
disdain for intellectual liberty when it conducted public 
book burnings that it held at nearly every German 
university on May 10, 1933 (Kelly, 1972; Gallin, 1986). 
Although the students were manipulated into initiating 
this campaign, a considerable amount of support existed 
among university faculty for the book burnings. Their 
disregard for the right of other professors to hold views 
contrary to their own reflected the low esteem in which 
they held the principle of Lehrfreiheit (Kelly, 1972; 
Kevles, 1978; Weinberg, 1986). Hans Naumann, professor
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of Germanistics at the University of Bonn, was thrilled 
with this movement among the youth. He wrote that:
We see this action as overpoweringly beautiful, it 
is not to be darkened or endangered through any 
human weaknesses. We want union and purity, high­
mindedness of conviction, subordination and 
association.
That is what we want for our hearts and that is 
what we also want in our literature....a literature 
which educates us...in kinship, be it in the 
profession, be it in allegiance or in the race and 
the nation. That [which] educates us to the state 
and to leadership and to obedience and to militant 
bearing (1972, 72).
Naumann's interpretation of the destruction of the 
findings of intellectuals of the past and of the present 
as being "overpoweringly beautiful" reflected the change 
in attitude about academic freedom within the Third Reich 
that led to its willingness to compromise the right of 
professors to publish an unhindered view of the truth 
(1972; 1978).
Although Franck's friends and colleagues petitioned 
him not to take hasty action, he knew that fundamental 
issues of principle were at stake. On April 17, Franck
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submitted the following letter to the Nazi appointed 
Minister of Education:
With these lines I ask you, Mr. Minister, to release 
me from my duties as full professor at the 
University of Gottingen and Director of the Second 
Physical Institute of this University.
This decision is an inner necessity for me 
because of the attitude of the government toward 
German Jewry (Beyerchen, 1977, 17).
In addition, Franck sent a letter of resignation to 
the Rector of the University of Gottingen, a copy of 
which he also made available to the Gottinaer Zeituncr. 
one of the city's two newspapers:
I have asked my superior authorities to release me 
from my office. I will attempt to continue my 
scientific work in Germany.
We Germans of Jewish descent are being treated 
as aliens and enemies of the Fatherland. It is 
demanded that our children grow up in the awareness 
that they will never be allowed to prove themselves 
as Germans.
Whoever was in the war is supposed to receive 
permission to serve the state further. I refuse to 
make use of this privilege, even though I also 
understand the position of those today who consider
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it their duty to hold out at their posts (Beyerchen,
1977, 17) .
Such public protest was highly unusual; however, 
holding dear the rights of university professors to make 
the public aware of those causes that violated the true 
German spirit, Franck hoped that, by taking his protest 
to the people, they might be moved to press the 
government to alter its anti-semitic policies (Bentwich, 
1953; Beyerchen, 1977).
Franck's letter of protest elicited editorial 
support by the Gottinger Zeituna. The editors wrote that 
the World War I honors that Franck had won, his war 
record, and the esteem that he had brought to Gottingen, 
all had served to economically benefit the city. He was 
responsible for having increased the number of students 
at the University and for securing a Rockefeller Grant to 
expand the University's buildings. The editors stated 
that they hoped that Franck's sacrifice would somehow 
prevent the dismissal of those individuals who would 
otherwise be lost to German science due to the 
stipulations of the Civil Service Law (Beyerchen, 1977).
Franck's correspondence was also printed by several 
other newspapers throughout Germany. Most of their 
articles contained expressions of concern that 
consideration must be given to the possible future
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implications of such legislation. In contrast, the 
Berliner Tageblatt. stated that Franck would have done 
better if he had remained at his post while issuing his 
protest against the Nazi regime; in other words, they 
felt his resignation was ill-timed and ill-advised 
{Fermi, 1987; Beyerchen, 1977).
Franck's story was quickly picked up by the London 
Times in an article entitled, "Treatment of Jews in 
Germany, Nobel Prize-Winners Protest" which appeared in 
the April 19, 1933 issue. His actions caused a 
definitive split along political ideological lines. Some 
pro-Nazi faculty believed that Franck was placing concern 
for his own right to academic freedom above the necessity 
for the establishment of the new Reich {Fermi, 1987; 
Beyerchen, 1977).
Professors on the medical faculty and in the 
agricultural institute of the University of Gottingen 
thought that Franck, along with those who had entered 
into discussions with him about his resignation, were 
conspiring to hinder the national cause. When the 
foreign press used Franck's resignation to support anti- 
German propaganda, forty-two instructors at Gottingen 
issued a condemnation of Franck's action. Their "42- 
Statement" charged that Franck's public resignation had 
impeded the domestic and foreign policy of the new
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government (Beyerchen, 1977; Weinberg, 1986). "We are 
unanimously agreed...that the form of [his] declaration 
of resignation is equivalent to an act of sabotage, and 
we hope that the government will therefore accelerate the 
realization of the necessary cleansing measures" (1977,
19) .
Although Franck recognized their right to disagree 
with his actions, the idea that such actions would 
require "cleansing" measures was anathema to the freedom 
of dissent that he believed was his right as a German 
professor. Franck contended that loyalty to a national 
political agenda did not necessarily have to conflict 
with the idea of academic freedom as long as that agenda 
allowed conflicting ideas an opportunity to surface and 
to be subject to review by the academic community.
However, when nationalistic policy holds that concepts in 
conflict with its tenets must be "cleansed" from the 
minds of its followers, then the principles of academic 
freedom must take precedence so that freedom itself may 
remain (Kevles, 1978; Macrakis, 1993).
Although Franck had desired to remain in Germany and 
had hoped for a position outside of the Civil Service 
from which he could continue his opposition to the 
National Socialist Party, the persistent execution of 
Nazi policy forced him to concede that he no longer had a
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place within the Fatherland. His willingness to place 
his safety as well as that of his family in jeopardy for 
the principles of academic freedom was the act of an 
heroic nature that set a precedent for others of like 
conviction to follow.
Otto Meyerhof in Germany
Germany, in 1930, led the world in the fields of 
physical and social sciences largely due to the efforts 
of excellent German researchers. However, by 1935, one 
out of every five university professors had been removed 
from their faculty positions. The "cleansing" policies 
of the National Socialist Party had forced either the 
emigration, the retirement, or the imprisonment of some 
of Germany's most eminent scientists (Bentwich, 1953; 
Nachmansohn, 1979).
In the area of medicine, the loss was particularly 
high due in part to the large representation of Jewish 
researchers and physicians in the medical field. Between 
1933 and 1938, 10,000 medical personnel had been forced 
to leave their jobs. Among those either compelled or 
coerced into leaving was the Nobel Laureate, Otto 
Meyerhof, who was Director of the world-famous Kaiser 
Wilhelm Institute of Physiology at Heidelberg (Kevles, 
1978; Proctor, 1988). Although he had hoped, as had so
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many other Jews, that the Nazi regime would not last very 
long, his decision to attempt to weather the storm of 
Hitler's anti-semitic policies eventually proved to be 
untenable (Beyerchen, 1977; Nachmansohn, 1979).
After leaving the Kaiser Wilhelm Institute of 
Biology in Berlin-Dahlem in 1929, Meyerhof took up 
residence at the newly-established Kaiser Wilhelm 
Institute at Heidelberg. The Institute was comprised of 
four independent research divisions: physics, chemistry, 
physiology, and basic medicine. Meyerhof had been 
selected to fill the position of Director of the 
Department of Physiology. For the first time in his 
career, he had at his disposal the facilities necessary 
to further his sophisticated research. Not only did he 
have the proper facilities, but also superlative 
colleagues. His fame attracted several medical 
researchers from around the world to the faculty of the 
Institute (Nachmansohn, 1979; Weinberg, 1986; Proctor, 
1988).
The Kaiser Wilhelm Society even built a magnificent 
house for him. Meyerhof had finally achieved what he 
considered to be the "dream of a true scientist: not 
glory, but the opportunity to carry out his creative work 
under the most comfortable, pleasant, and efficient 
conditions" (Nachmansohn, 1979, 283). While he was in
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the midst of these most active and dynamic years of his 
career Hitler became Chancellor of Germany, the Nazi 
Party gained control of the Reichstag. and the Law for 
the Re-establishment of the Professional Civil Service 
was passed (Fleming and Bailyn, 1969; 1979; Weinberg,
1986).
Meyerhof had qualified as a certified lecturer of 
physiology at the University of Kiel in 1912 and had 
worked there until 1924 when he achieved the status of 
Professor Extraordinary. That being the case, he, though 
a Jew, was exempt from the dismissal policies of the 
Civil Service Act under the World War I state service 
stipulation (Nachmansohn, 1979; Weinberg, 1986).
Although the exemption existed, state officials were 
authorized to determine, based upon racial heritage, who 
could and could not serve as professors in German 
institutions of higher education.
Meyerhof was exempted. His decision to accept the 
exemption, in spite of the governmental manipulation that 
it represented, resulted from his hesitancy to leave a 
situation where his scientific work was proceeding well 
and where many highly qualified investigators had come to 
work with him (Nachmansohn, 1979; Niewyk, 1980). His 
choice to remain at the Institute was heralded by the
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Kaiser Wilhelm Society's President as being most 
fortuitous (Beyerchen, 1977).
After the decision had been made to remain in 
Germany and to endure the difficulties incumbent in such 
a determination, Meyerhof used his position to implement 
several strategies that were in direct opposition to the 
restrictions upon intellectual liberty established by the 
Civil Service Law. In so doing, he was able to ensure 
the continuation of the careers of many of his Jewish 
colleagues (Beyerchen, 1977; Nachmansohn, 1979).
Initially, as Director of a Kaiser Wilhelm 
Institute, Meyerhof wrote a letter to Frederick Glum, the 
acting President of the Society, to remind the officer of 
the "moral duty one had to employees who had served the 
Society for many years" (Macrakis, 1993, 54). He 
emphasized that the Society and its membership could not 
change the law; but, he also stressed--to no avail--that 
the utmost should be done to "modify the brutality in the 
ruthless application of the law" (1993, 55).
Another strategy of Meyerhof's was to use the semi- 
private status of the Kaiser Wilhelm Society as a means 
of protecting as many professors from dismissal as 
possible. Since the Civil Service Law's "cleansing 
policy" applied only to those institutions that received 
more than 50% of their funding from the government, the
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Nazis' did not have total control over his Institute. 
Realizing that he was funded from both state and private 
monies, with the larger portion coming from private 
sources, Meyerhof was able to maneuver around the 
dismissal policy on behalf of his "non-Aryan" professors. 
By using the Institute's semi-private funding statue, 
Meyerhof helped to maintain its academic freedom during 
the difficult years from 1933 through 1938 (Jackman and 
Borden, 1983; Macrakis, 1993).
The National Socialist Party, in its move to control 
all education, had violated the academic principle of 
Lehrfreiheit by requiring professors to propagate the 
Nazi Party agenda. Faculty who had received university 
positions were required to participate in political 
training so that they could indoctrinate their university 
students with National Socialist ideology. Since 
professors in those positions were, in actuality, 
training the youth in the tenets of Nazi policy, Party 
officials were generally very inquisitive as to their 
racial backgrounds. However, Meyerhof's professors and 
their students, due to the semi-private status of the 
Institute, were far enough removed from the educational 
main-stream that they were able to avoid such regulations 
and the inevitable scrutiny that came with them
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(Bentwich, 1953; Beyerchen, 1977; Kevles, 1978; Macrakis, 
1993) .
In addition, Meyerhof labored with the Society to 
increase the monetary support of Germany's 
industrialists. This enabled the Institute of Physiology 
to ensure that financial concerns would not cause them to 
have to relinquish their non-government status and their 
control over their right to academic self-governance. 
Meyerhof worked to elect presidents of the Society from 
among the leaders of industry rather than only from the 
fields of science. The selection of these individuals as 
Society presidents was a skillful diplomatic move 
(Niewyk, 1980; Macrakis, 1993).
Any connection with industry served to improve 
relations with the National Socialists, since the Nazi's 
needed whatever help they could get from the industrial 
sector to assist their build-up of war technology. If 
the industrialists were supportive of the Kaiser Wilhelm 
Society's Institutes, the likelihood of Nazi interference 
with those Institutes was decreased (Fleming and Bailyn, 
1969; Beyerchen, 1977).
The benefits of this industrial connection also 
extended to the facilitation of Meyerhof's attempts to 
fill the professorial positions vacated as a result of 
the dismissal policy of the Civil Service Law. Since the
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Nazi's wanted to maintain good relations with the 
industrialists who supported the work done by the 
Society, Meyerhof's candidates for faculty posts were 
generally accepted by the Nazi Ministry of Education.
The ability to formulate and to execute such positive 
strategies accounted in large part for Meyerhof's and his 
Institute's relatively undisturbed survival in the 
advance of Hitler's anti-semitic juggernaught (Beyechen, 
1977; Kevles, 1978; Nachmansohn, 1979) .
As Meyerhof worked to maintain both his position of 
influence and his research, his efforts on behalf of his 
colleagues could only be categorized as unusual. He had 
been born into a well-established upper middle-class 
family and had been totally absorbed in his youth with 
philosophy, art, and science. After a serious illness, 
he had been sent to Egypt for four months to recover. 
During this period of forced seclusion, Meyerhof went 
through a philosophical and artistic metamorphosis. The 
result, for Meyerhof in his later years, was a more 
humane approach to both the science of medicine and to 
its practitioners. His colleagues were co-discoverers 
not just co-workers; therefore, his "moral duty"
(Macrakis, 1993, 54) to them extended beyond the academic 
realm. His humane approach, contrasted against the 
backdrop of the inhumanity of Nazi politics, motivated
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him to continue to work in Germany and to ensure, as long 
as he could, the safety of his colleagues (Bentwich,
1953; Nachmansohn, 1979; 1993).
Despite the implementation of his strategies to 
remain in Germany and to assist others to do the same, 
Meyerhof's campaign eventually was overwhelmed by the 
determination of the Nazi Party to press its agenda upon 
every segment of German society. In addition, by the 
middle 1930s the Reichstag gave the Ministry of Education 
in Berlin the authority to classify any instances of 
"non-conformity" to Nazi policy as treasonous (Gallin,
1986) . In other words, if the political ideology of a 
professor did not align with the ideals of the Third 
Reich, both he and his research were judged as "non- 
conforming" and thereby "un-German" (1986; Nachmansohn, 
1979). Once again, the government increased its control 
over the minds of the professoriate. To think, speak, or 
publish anything contrary to the Nazi agenda was deemed 
an act of treason. The National Socialists determined 
that they had the right to dominate all expressions of 
the truth that were necessary for the maintenance of the 
people's liberty (Macrakis, 1993).
Increasingly, Meyerhof found himself in the 
situation of choosing between exile or capitulation. 
According to William Dodd, the United States Ambassador
117
to Germany at that time, "The universities have been 
deprived of the place they once held as centers of German 
intellectual life....all the disciplines within the 
university had suffered because nothing could be taught 
that conflicted with the 'Nazi faith'" (Weinberg, 1986, 
100). Meyerhof eventually had to acknowledge to himself 
and to others that his "position had become untenable" 
(Macrakis, 1993, 65) and that he would, therefore, have 
to leave Germany.
Otto Stern in Germany 
On the day that Adolph Hitler became Chancellor of 
Germany, January 30, 1933, Otto Stern informed his 
colleagues at the University of Hamburg that he was going 
to resign from his position as professor of physical 
chemistry. Temporarily dissuaded by the pleas of his 
colleagues, Stern agreed to delay his decision. However, 
he stressed to them that, at the first hint of any 
attempt by the Nazi's to interfere with the personnel in 
his department, he would indeed leave. Stern had seen, 
over the past two decades, the anti-semitism that was 
growing within the German state. He realized that, with 
the rise of the Nazi Party to power, the future of Jewish 
scientists within academia would grow increasingly 
uncertain. Within weeks of the National Socialists
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having passed the Civil Service Laws in April, 1933, the 
impact of the new dismissal policy was felt in Stern's 
department. In June of that same year, Stern walked out 
of his laboratory, never to return (Farber, 1953; Clark, 
1984; Weber, 1980).
Otto Stern's early academic career had greatly 
benefitted by his birth into a prosperous Jewish family, 
which desired that their children satisfy their thirst 
for knowledge by traveling and exploring several fields 
before deciding on a career. Although his studies at the 
Gymnasium emphasized the Classics, Stern's private 
readings lead him to further explore several areas of 
science and mathematics. When the time came for him to 
follow his interests at the university level, the 
financial support from his family provided the means for 
him to migrate from university to university. He was 
able to attend lectures on a variety of subjects without 
regard to curricula or the time needed for completion of 
promotion requirements. Stern experienced the classic 
expression of Lernfreiheit throughout his years as a 
university student {Heathcote, 1953; Grunberger, 1971; 
Beyerchen, 1977).
During this time of independent academic pursuit, he 
attended lectures on both theoretical and experimental 
physics, which gave him the foundation for his later
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decision to pursue a career in theoretical science.
After he received his Ph.D. in 1912, his decision to work 
in theoretical physics brought him into contact with 
Albert Einstein. He became one of Einstein's post­
doctoral associates both at the German University in 
Prague, from 1911-1912, and then at the Technische 
Hochschule in Zurich, from 1912-1914 (Kevles, 1978;
Weber, 1980; Schlessinger and Schlessinger, 1986;
Macrakis, 1993).
Subsequent to his work with Einstein and his 
teaching positions at the Universities of Frankfurt and 
Rostock, Stern accepted a chair as professor of physical 
chemistry in 1923 at the University of Hamburg, where he 
immediately was given the opportunity to establish a 
molecular beam research laboratory. Stern had finally 
been given an opportunity both to teach and to do the 
research that he had, for over a decade, wanted to begin 
(Heathcote, 1953; Fleming and Bailyn, 1969; Proctor,
1988) .
Although Stern had chosen the field of theoretical 
physics primarily because of his intense interest in the 
subject, there was another reason for his selection--the 
limited opportunity to choose other academic areas in 
which to work. The anti-semitic prejudice that began to 
develop among the German professoriate during the years
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of the Weimar Republic indirectly caused many talented 
young researchers to move into physics rather than into 
other areas of science. In general, the non-Jewish 
German professoriate did not insist upon a Jewish 
student's right to choose the field in which he studied. 
Usually, the professors in the more established 
disciplines, that is, chemistry, were unwilling to take 
on Jewish students. They did, however, not prevent them 
from moving into those areas where Jews had already 
established themselves (Bentwich, 1953; Beyerchen, 1977; 
Nachmansohn, 1979; Niewyk, 1980).
Although access to the broad spectrum of academia 
was not "encouraged" for Jewish students, one area in 
which Jewish scholars were tolerated, was physics. Their 
relatively high concentration in physics departments 
later proved to be a disadvantage for Jewish professors, 
for it made them perfect targets for Nazi attacks against 
their intellectual freedom (Bentwich, 1953; Nachmansohn, 
1979; Niewyk, 1980).
As mentioned previously, two German scientists who 
were quite open in their racist attitudes toward Jewish 
professors were Philipp Lenard and Johannes Stark.
Lenard had written a text book whose introduction came to 
serve as the battle cry for "German" physicists:
"'German physics?' People will ask. I could have also
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said Aryan physics or physics of Nordic natured persons, 
physics of the reality-founders, of the truth-seekers, 
physics of those who have founded natural research" 
(Beyerchen, 1977, 125).
Stark's writings repeatedly attacked the reliability 
of Jewish physics from the perspective that a 
researcher's racial heritage affected the conclusion he 
would draw from his work (Weinberg, 1986). The 
assumption that being a Jew meant that one's findings 
would automatically have a Jewish limitation to it called 
into question the integrity of Jewish professors and 
assumed that their scientific endeavors were not geared 
toward pursuing the truth, but toward presenting Jewish 
propaganda (Beyerchen, 1977).
Such protracted philosophical attacks lay at the 
root of Stern's initial response to Hitler's move into 
power. He knew that the imposition of anti-semitic 
policies would probably increase. When the Civil Service 
Laws were passed, although Stern was exempted from 
dismissal due to his service in the German Army during 
World War I, he could foresee the inevitability of the 
corruption of intellectual life that would follow 
(Kevles, 1978; Gordon, 1984; Proctor, 1988).
The seriousness of the situation for "Jewish" 
scientists that had developed between the April passage
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of the Civil Service Laws and Stern's June resignation is 
confirmed by the contents of a letter written on June 19, 
1933 by the American mathematician, John von Neumann, to 
Princeton mathematician, Oswald Veblen. Relative to his 
recent visit to Germany, von Neumann wrote that:
Germany....was very depressing. We have been three 
days in Gottingen and the rest in Berlin, and had 
time to see and appreciate the effects of the 
present German madness. It is simply horrible. In 
Gottingen, in the first place, it is quite obvious 
that if these boys [Nazis] continue for only two 
more years (which is unfortunately very probable), 
they will ruin German science for a generation--at 
least (Fleming and Bailyn, 1969, 205).
Stern's recognition that anti-semitism would 
increase under the Nazi regime was confirmed when the 
Nazi Party demanded that he dismiss his Jewish 
colleagues. With this, Stern realized that his own 
professional demise was not far away. These realities 
led him to resign from his professorial chair as he 
recognized the historical pattern of violation of the 
academic freedom of the German Jewish professoriate.
German science no longer held a place for him.
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The Opportunities in America 
An article in the November 7, 1938 issue of 
Newsweek, opened with the following line: "The United
States now leads the world in science." The statement 
declared that the accumulation in America over the 
previous two decades of superior intellects represented 
in its scientific community had surpassed all other 
nations (Kevles, 1978).
In support of this claim, several accomplishments 
could be enumerated. American graduate schools were 
offering first-rate training in both the fundamentals and 
the frontiers of scientific thought. Students no longer 
felt compelled to travel abroad to find high levels of 
intense and sophisticated research. Throughout the 
country several well-appointed laboratories had superior 
professorial staffs running them. Scientific journals 
from the United States were filled with ground-breaking 
articles and their publication was awaited with 
anticipation throughout the world (Kevles, 1978; Perry,
1984) .
America owed no little debt for this new-found fame 
within the global scientific community to the numerous 
European immigrants who had come to this country since 
1933 (Fermi, 1987). Once absorbed into America's system 
of colleges and universities, these refugees enriched
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science departments with their "mathematical techniques, 
their experimental imagination, and their sophisticated 
philosophical approach to the analysis of natural 
phenomena" (Kevles, 1978, 282).
On the surface, a fertile academic environment 
replete with world-renowned immigrant scientists was 
functioning within the "picture-perfect" atmosphere of a 
spirit of cooperation. Underneath the surface, however, 
the American scene was characterized by some shortcomings 
that have historically been part of the journey 
undertaken by those "yearning to breathe free" (Fermi,
1987). In the case of the emigrating intellectuals 
during the 1930s, three particular adverse situations 
confronted them: the Great Depression, communism, and
anti-semitism (Fleming and Bailyn, 1969; Kevles, 1978; 
Clark, 1984).
The Great Depression
In June, 1933, Alvin Johnson, head of the New School 
for Social Research, estimated that 5,000 Ph.D. graduates 
from American universities were unemployed in the United 
States. The Great Depression had hit the academic 
community hard and its impact was especially felt by 
these newest entrants. In the face of too many 
academically qualified individuals chasing too few
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professorial and research positions, foreign immigrant 
professors appeared as "unfair" competition. On the 
other hand, college and university administrators could 
not ignore the highly qualified senior immigrant 
professors who were knocking on their doors. Such being 
the case, a university often risked criticism when it 
bypassed American candidates for positions and instead 
selected foreign researchers (Fermi, 1987; Perry, 1984; 
Weinberg, 1986).
Realistically, there was not enough money to go 
around. The Depression had caused government financial 
support for research to begin to plummet. During the 
early 1930s, Congressional economizers had slashed the 
budgets of federal research projects an average of twelve 
and one-half percent. These projects, even after their 
appropriations had passed by their appropriate 
committees, still barely made it through debate on the 
floor of Congress, By 1933, federal support for 
education had fallen as much as twenty-six percent from 
pre-depression levels (Fleming, 1980; Perry, 1984)
University budgets were also being cut considerably 
by state legislatures as well as by governors who often 
required more reductions before approving them. Private 
capital funds also collapsed and some endowments for 
research, such as those at Cornell, were completely
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devastated. The annual income of the endowed Carnegie 
Institution of Washington fell by over $1 million. 
Washington University in St. Louis had so little money 
that it was unable to complete the third story of its 
physics building; instead, that floor was converted into 
a children's skating rink. The reduction in financial 
support faced by American colleges and universities from 
both their public and private benefactors meant that 
fewer professorial positions awaited an increasing number 
of applicants, both foreign and domestic (Kevles, 1978; 
Perry, 1984).
To further complicate matters, the public had grown 
discontented with the wonders of the new technology of 
the "machine civilization" (Kevles, 1978, 257). 
Unfortunately, technology was often blamed for high 
levels of unemployment. Americans began wondering if 
science had produced more than consumers could absorb and 
if machines were destroying more jobs than they could 
create. The resulting lack of public enthusiasm for the 
funding of scientific endeavors further narrowed the 
number of and entrance to new academic positions (Fleming 
and Bailyn, 1969; 1978; Weinberg, 1986).
This lack of popular support for funding new 
university positions was also due in part to citizen 
concern for their own financial security. As William
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Green, the President of the American Federation of Labor, 
had pointed out, the cast-offs of technology had been 
able previously to find work in new industries. However, 
the economic climate of the early 1930s offered no new 
industries for these newly unemployed (Clark, 1984;.
Perry, 1984). President Hoover's Committee on Recent 
Social Trends even reported that, "Unless there is a 
speeding up of social invention, or a slowing down of 
mechanical invention, grave maladjustments are certain to 
result" (Kevles, 1978, 237). This mood and reality of 
tight money and native-born American self-preservation 
often set scholar against scholar and layman against 
intellectual. The environment was perfect for an 
intensification of American xenophobia.
Communism
As America entered World War I, patriotism was 
often focused in the direction of Theodore Roosevelt's 
slogan, "America for Americans" (Fermi, 1987, 21). In an 
effort to promote this concept of "100% Americanism"
(1987, 21), patriotic crusaders sometimes even went into 
minority neighborhoods to encourage Americanization of 
the foreign-born. Such well-meaning efforts faded, 
however, when German agents committed the first acts of 
sabotage in the United States during World War I.
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Instead, these incidents inevitably led to a campaign 
against German-born "hyphenated Americans" whose loyalty 
to America was now presumed to be divided (1987; Kevles, 
1978) .
The schism, which continued throughout the war, 
intensified at its end. Post-war America experienced a 
new surge of patriotic nationalism, due to its victory in 
World War I and its elevation into a position of 
international prominence. Nationalism bolstered the idea 
that admitting aliens was an unwarranted hazard to 
national welfare (Fermi, 1987; Clark, 1984). This 
foundation of fear was strengthened during the 1920s and 
early 1930s by the furor over communism.
The American Communist Party of the 1920s was 
composed primarily of immigrants who had come to America 
during the previous twenty years. Nine out of every ten 
Communist Party members was an immigrant. Of this 
foreign membership, the second largest group was made up 
of individuals of Jewish origin. Of the nearly 16,000 
members of the Party in 1925, over 1,400 were Jews who 
spoke as their native tongue the Yiddish dialect.
However, within the other foreign-language sections of 
the Party, such as the Polish, Rumanian, Russian, 
Lithuanian, Hungarian, etc., there were also individuals 
of Jewish heritage. Consequently, the American Communist
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Party was viewed as having a heavy Jewish influence 
(Glaser, 1978).
Such figures did not reflect the political views of 
most Jews in America since, at the Communist Party's 
height in the middle 1930s, its membership only briefly 
rose above 50,000 at a time when there were over 
4,500,000 Jews in America. However, these raid-1920 
figures were enough to create fear among the American 
populace that the ideals of the American dream were being 
supplanted by foreign-born "non-Americans" (Klehr, 1984).
"Red Scare" (Fermi, 1987) hysteria began to sweep 
through the United States. The idea that American 
capitalism could be replaced with European communism and 
that these new immigrants should have the opportunity to 
enjoy what natural-born Americans had worked so hard to 
establish brought fear into the heart of the "average" 
American. This double-edged political and economic sword 
struck deep into those whose idea of nationalism excluded 
foreigners and whose xenophobic fears primarily focused 
on the Jew (1987).
The blame for the influx of communism into the 
American dream on those who were not "truly" American 
made communism appear to be an entirely foreign import.
In order for "loyal" Americans to prevent its spread, it 
was logical for them to curb the access its perpetrators
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had to American society. Although intellectuals as a 
whole were unwilling to take the final step of actually 
becoming communists, their liberal stance was viewed by 
some Americans as sufficient confirmation of their 
commitment to universal communism. Such stereotypic 
inferences served to widen the gap between immigrants and 
those university positions that were supposedly to be 
filled only by "patriotic" Americans {Fermi, 1987; Perry, 
1984; Weinberg, 1986; Klehr and Haynes, 1992).
Anti-Semitism 
Just as the "Red Scare" limited immigrants in their 
attempts to assimilate into American society, a parallel 
mass hysteria, the "Jewish Scare" during the 1920s and 
1930s (Weinberg, 1986), isolated the Jewish segment 
within the immigrant population, making their integration 
into American culture quite difficult. The anti-semitism 
of the "Jewish Scare" was greatly aggravated by the 
actions of multi-millionaire industrialist, Henry Ford. 
During the 1930s, The Dearborn Independent. Ford's weekly 
newspaper, with a circulation of over 250,000, printed 
exposes of alleged Jewish evils in ninety-one consecutive 
weekly issues. He then reprinted excerpts of this series 
in a four-volume pamphlet entitled, "The International 
Jew" and had it translated into sixteen different
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languages so that his anti-semitic message was even more 
widely circulated (Fleming and Bailyn, 1969; 1986). The 
blatant use of the Jew as a scapegoat for the social ills 
of the era by such an influential individual served to 
further exacerbate the anti-Jewish feeling in America.
During the decades of the 1920s and 1930s, the Ku 
Klux Klan also pushed to make "the Jew" a national issue. 
With chapters at such universities as Harvard, Yale, and 
Syracuse as well as in many mid-western and southern 
towns, the Klan was able to spread its anti-semitic 
propaganda across the various social strata in America.
It was not uncommon for the Klan to "frequently, [in] 
Friday evening automobile caravans, pass synagogues, 
shouting insults from behind their white hoods"
(Weinberg, 1986, 214) . With such forces at work, anti­
semitism gradually became institutionalized in American 
society (Franklin, 1981; 1986).
As historian, Stanley Feldstein (1978) wrote in his 
survey of three centuries of Jewish history:
During these decades, employment agencies openly 
advertised that 'No Jews need apply;' quota systems 
were adopted by universities, membership in social 
and professional organizations was limited to 
'Christians only,' and 'gentlemen's agreements' were
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reached to keep the 'sheenies' out of the 'better' 
residential neighborhoods (1978, 283). 
in such a hostile environment, American higher 
education was largely closed to Jewish candidates for 
faculty positions. By the middle 1920s, less than 100 
Jews could be counted among the university professoriate 
of liberal arts and science faculties in the United 
States. In 1930, Washington Square College of New York 
University, which enrolled the largest Jewish student 
body in the world, employed no Jewish professors. Not 
that there was a lack of Jewish candidates for 
professorial positions; rather, the paucity was due to 
prejudice and discrimination. Highly qualified Jewish 
applicants were often placed on waiting lists, where they 
"waited" endlessly (Fleming and Bailyn, 1969; Clark,
1984; Fermi, 1987) . Obviously, certain university 
faculties and administrations were unwilling to stand 
against the prejudices of their times.
In one respect, American anti-semitism differed from 
the European variety. The limitations it imposed upon 
Jews were not necessarily inflicted by the state; rather, 
it was the "'private governments' -- industry and trade, 
banks and insurance companies, real estate boards and 
neighborhood associations, clubs and societies, colleges" 
that erected walls to keep Jews out (McWilliams, 1948,
133
147-148). it was this America, filled both with 
opportunities and prejudices that greeted the four elite 
scientists upon their arrival from Germany. Once again, 
they had to struggle to find their response.
Albert Einstein in America 
"Wouldn't it be funny if they won't let me in? Why, 
the whole world would laugh at America," responded 
Einstein to a newspaper reporter's questions about the 
conversation he had had during the course of applying for 
his visa to the United States at the American Consulate 
in Berlin in December 1932 (Sayen, 1985, 7). George 
Messersmith, the American Consul, was out of Berlin when 
Einstein came to the get his visa. Problems had begun to 
develop when Einstein, who was normally spared having to 
answer the series of questions typically asked of 
individuals applying for visas, was questioned by Raymond 
B. Geist, assistant to the American Consul (Fermi, 1987;
1985).
Mr. Geist asked numerous questions ranging from 
queries about Einstein's political affiliations to 
inquiries about the purpose for his visit to the United 
States. Finally, the weary Einstein exploded at the 
assistant with the statement, "What's this, an
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inquisition? Is this an attempt at chicanery?" {Sayen, 
1985, 7).
Einstein was quick to inform Mr. Geist that he had 
not asked to go to America; but, had been begged to visit 
the country by American scientists. He went on to say 
that, if he was to be considered a "suspect," he would 
prefer to cancel his trip. Einstein then demanded that 
his visa be issued by noon the following day or he would 
remain in Berlin. By that afternoon, the press had 
picked up the story and the American Consulate became the 
target of international ridicule. Einstein got his visa 
(French, 1979; Clark, 1984; Sayen, 1985).
This event had followed an even more explosive 
situation that had begun to develop a month earlier. 
Einstein had been invited to spend a third consecutive 
winter-term at the California Institute of Technology.
When Mrs. Randolph Frothingham, President of the Woman 
Patriotic Corporation, heard of the invitation, she 
submitted a sixteen-page brief to the State Department.
The legal brief on behalf of the Corporation requested 
that Einstein be barred from entering America (Fleming 
and Bailyn, 1969; Clark, 1984).
The Corporation claimed that Einstein was the leader 
of an "anarcho-communist program to shatter the military 
machinery" of the existing government as a "preliminary
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condition" for a world-wide people's revolution (Sayen, 
1985, 6). Recognizing that Einstein's scientific and 
religious views could not prevent his entry, the brief 
charged that he had
promoted lawless confusion to shatter the Church as 
well as the State--and to leave, if possible, even 
the laws of nature and the principles of science in 
confusion and disorder and subject to revision with 
every new proclamation of an Einstein Theory1 His 
frequently revised theory of relativity is of no 
more practical importance than the answer to the old 
academic riddle, "How many angels can stand on the 
point of a needle if angels do not occupy space" 
(1985, 6) .
Even though these events had occurred a few months 
prior to Hitler's official acceptance of the position as 
Chancellor of Germany, they represented the difficulties 
experienced by Einstein in his attempts to enter the 
United States. Although Einstein was an international 
figure, whose scientific value to mankind had many times 
been heralded, the impact of American xenophobia still 
touched him. After renouncing his German citizenship and 
spending a short time in England lecturing, Einstein 
sailed to America to become the first professor of the
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Institute of Advanced Study in Princeton, New Jersey 
(Kevles, 1978; French, 1979).
Upon his arrival, a pattern of challenges to 
Einstein's academic freedom emerged due to Abraham 
Flexner's autocratic control over the Institute of 
Advanced Study. Flexner, Einstein's academic recruiter 
and the Institute's Director, began to infringe upon 
Einstein's academic freedom by taking control of his 
personal appointments. Flexner repeatedly rejected 
outside invitations for the scientist using the excuse 
that such interruptions would not be conducive to 
advancing his research. Initially, this control did not 
appear to bother Einstein, in that he was a reserved 
individual who enjoyed his solitude (Dukas and Hoffmann, 
1979; Sayen, 1985).
Flexner also discouraged Einstein from becoming 
involved with Jewish activities. When Einstein had 
played his violin at a Jewish benefit, and his picture 
had appeared in the New York Times. Flexner voiced 
concern that Einstein's attendance at such activities 
would fan the flames of anti-semitism. Perhaps, Flexner 
feared potential adverse publicity. The Institute's 
survival depended upon the generosity of donors whose 
views on Zionism and politics did not necessarily 
coincide with those of Einstein. From this and other
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similar incidents, it slowly became obvious that extra­
mural utterances by Einstein were perceived by Flexner as 
being detrimental to the new Institute (Fleming and 
Bailyn, 1969; Fermi, 1987).
Flexner also had rejected an invitation to Dr. and 
Mrs. Einstein from President and Mrs. Roosevelt for 
dinner at the White House, using the same excuse of 
research privacy without exception. Upon hearing of 
Flexner's response, Einstein wrote a letter to Mrs. 
Roosevelt expressing his sincere regret for this action.
He wrote, "You can hardly imagine of what great interest 
it would have been for me to meet the man who is tackling 
with gigantic energy the greatest and most difficult 
problem of our time" (Sayen, 1985, 66) . Upon receipt of 
Einstein's letter, Mrs. Roosevelt immediately extended a 
second invitation, which the Einstein's accepted (Clark, 
1984; 1985) .
As a result of such incidents, Einstein grew furious 
with Flexner. His irritation was expressed once in a 
return address on a letter to Rabbi Wise, "Concentration 
Camp, Princeton" (Sayen, 1985, 66). Einstein, in a long 
letter to the Board of Trustees of the Institute, 
complained about Flexner's interference in his private 
affairs and threatened to resign if Flexner did not leave 
him alone. Flexner immediately terminated his daily
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admonitions and memos. His next correspondence to 
Einstein was dated several years later (Clark, 1984;
Sayen, 1985).
By the mid-1930s, Flexner's poor interpersonal 
relations extended beyond merely Einstein. The rest of 
the faculty felt that they had a right to participate in 
daily and future policy and decision-making in the 
Institute. They requested representation on the Board of 
Trustees (Clark, 1984; Sayen, 1985; Dukas and Hoffmann, 
1979).
Over the next several years, relations between the 
Director and the faculty continued to worsen. Finally, 
in November 1932, after no improvement, Einstein 
addressed a letter to his close friend Samuel Leidesdorf, 
Treasurer of the Institute's Board of Trustees. He 
shared his fear that a growing number of issues involving 
the Institute could jeopardize its autonomy and 
development. Einstein's main concern was the growing 
influence that Princeton University was having over the 
Institute's internal affairs. It had been said, at a 
faculty meeting at the Institute, that "A young 
mathematician was denied admission...in a discrete 
manner, because his being 'colored' would have caused 
problems with Princeton University" (Sayen, 1985, 92). 
Flexner, at the meeting, had not questioned the facts,
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but denied knowledge of the incident (Kevles, 1978;
French, 1979; 1985).
Einstein and many of his Institute colleagues did 
question the incident as well as Flexner's knowledge of 
it. They also wondered whether other undesirables, such 
as Jews, might be excluded from admission. By way of 
substantiating their concern, Einstein pointed out that 
he had learned that a high ranking administrator at the 
University had told a group of friends that "there are 
too many Jews [at the Institute]" (Sayen, 1985, 92). 
Einstein was alarmed by the direct attack upon ethnicity 
that was being carried out by the Institute and the 
University. Their actions amounted to a denigration of 
the essence of intellectual freedom (Fleming and Bailyn, 
1969; French, 1979; 1985)
Einstein was also concerned that, with Flexner 
nearing retirement, a change in the Directorship of the 
Institute would soon occur. He feared that, due to 
Flexner's autocratic managerial tendencies, a new 
appointment would be made without any faculty 
participation. Such an unilateral decision would have 
been inconsistent with making the Institute a place where 
each faculty member shared in the governance process. 
Einstein was also concerned that the Board of Trustees 
would be sacrificing their authority. This decision­
140
making process might be so subtle that the Trustees would 
be unaware of the interference (Dukas and Hoffmann, 1979; 
Clark, 1984; Sayen, 1985).
Once again, in December, 1937, Einstein addressed a 
letter to Leidesdorf. In this correspondence, he charged 
that the faculty still did not have a true voice in the 
affairs of the Institute. Although Flexner had finally 
recommended two faculty members to serve on the Board, 
Einstein and the other professors did not feel that they 
represented the faculty. They had been chosen without 
professorial consultation. He also questioned why none 
of those appointed were Jewish (Dukas and Hoffmann, 1979; 
Clark, 1984; Sayen, 1985).
Einstein suggested the only possible solution was 
for faculty to choose their own representatives and to 
invest them with the formal authority to represent their 
views to the Board. He concluded the letter by asking 
Leidesdorf to initiate appropriate action with the Board. 
He received no reply to his letter and apparently no 
action was taken. Once again, the request for Institute 
policy to be supportive of faculty self-government was 
ignored, this time at the highest level of policy-making 
(Fermi, 1987; Kevles, 1978; Sayen, 1985).
in 1938, the faculty of the Institute was again in 
an uproar. Flexner appointed two faculty members in his
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new School of Economics and Politics without consulting 
two of the three sitting professors. Neither appointee 
was a distinguished scholar, neither was an experienced 
teacher, and neither had a Ph.D. The faculty felt that 
neither man was qualified to teach at a graduate school. 
Nevertheless, Flexner had employed them at the maximum 
salary. Einstein and the other faculty members felt that 
it was essential for the selection of new faculty members 
to involve peer evaluation and consent. For the contrary 
to occur was counter productive to the maintenance of 
high academic standards for teaching (Kevles, 1978;
Clark, 1984; Sayen, 1985)
Finally, in response to these repeated violations of 
academic freedom, the faculty passed, in March, 1939, a 
formal resolution asking Flexner to bring before the 
Trustees their request to be consulted on the appointment 
of the Director. The persistence of the faculty over the 
next several months relative to this issue forced Flexner 
to admit, in early August, that he could no longer co­
exist with his faculty. He tendered his resignation 
effective October 9, 1939 (Fermi, 1987; Dukas and 
Hoffmann, 1979; Clark, 1984).
The Institute's new Director, Frank Aydelotte, 
exerted a calming influence through his willingness both 
to recognize the faculty's role in the governance of the
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Institute and to acknowledge their autonomy. He even 
moved his office so that, as Director, he was no longer 
isolated from the other scholars in the Institute. This 
daily contact proved to be immensely helpful in ensuring 
a unified approach to issues of concern to the Institute 
(French, 1979; Clark, 1984).
Although Einstein loathed faculty politics and 
harbored no personal ambitions, when the issue was the 
question of academic freedom, he was willing, as always, 
to be a leading figure in the conflict. Through his 
actions and those of his colleagues, a greater level of 
academic freedom was experienced, especially under Dr. 
Aydelotte's leadership. Where there had once been 
little, if any, professorial representation on the Board, 
there was now a clear understanding of the need for 
faculty to assist in governing the Institute.
Additionally, the place of the faculty in the evaluation 
of candidates for academic positions was secured.
Finally/ the freedom of association and expression 
outside the Institute's walls had been firmly 
established.
James Franck in America
Immediately after leaving Germany, Franck accepted a 
one-year professorship at the University of Copenhagen in
143
Denmark. Upon fulfilling this commitment, he arrived in 
America in 1935 to take a position as professor of 
physical chemistry at Johns Hopkins University. Although 
Franck had planned to remain at this position, he left 
after only three years. The unrelenting anti-semitic 
attitude displayed toward the Jewish members of the 
faculty by the University's President, Isaiah Bowman, was 
apparently the primary impetus. Franck, having left a 
country in which his academic freedom had been curtailed 
by government policy, now found himself attached to a 
university where he was restricted by a president who was 
allowed to give full sway to his racist sentiments 
(Duggan and Drury, 1948; Fleming and Bailyn, 1969;
Kevles, 1978; Jackman and Borden, 1983).
The anti-semitic behavior of Bowman was particularly 
strange in light of his decision, only one year later, to 
sign a Rockefeller Foundation sponsored report entitled, 
"Proposed Program for Joint Action by the American 
Universities to Provide an Asylum for Those Refugees from 
European Countries Who Are Distinguished Members of the 
International Community of Scholars--Declaration of 
Principles" (Duggan and Drury, 1948). This document had 
been formulated with the intent of securing the 
cooperation and financial donations of wealthy Jews in 
order to assist immigrant Jewish professors in the United
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States. Bowman and the other signers expected that these 
financial benefactors would more readily endow 
foundations and grants for the employment of immigrant 
Jewish professors if the university administrators 
seeking such support had pledged to encourage and promote 
potential Jewish faculty members (Duggan and Drury, 1948; 
Schlessinger and Schlessinger, 1986).
The text of the report Included various references 
to the immigrant professors and their plight:
The American universities and colleges further 
recognize the importance of taking some joint action 
to assist the members of the academic world who are 
today suffering through no fault of their own and 
who have been deprived of their opportunity of 
contributing to the advancement of knowledge. This 
action is to be undertaken...to further that ancient 
university tradition which recognized no racial or 
national barriers to free inquiry or the promotion 
of sound learning. It is the belief of the 
undersigned administrative heads of the American 
universities and colleges that in making 
appointments to the staff, merit alone should be 
considered (Duggan and Drury, 1948, 99).
In affixing their names to this report, individuals 
pledged the cooperation of their organizations and their
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institutions of higher education not to focus upon race, 
but, instead to lean upon an individual's merit. The 
report was designed to foster, beginning at the 
organizational level, the continued growth of an 
atmosphere of professorial intellectual liberty (1948).
The document was signed by the officers of the 
Association of American Universities, the Association of 
State Universities, the Association of Urban 
Universities, the Association of American Colleges, and 
college and university presidents whose names would be 
influential. Appearing among the signatures of these 
individuals were those of twelve university president's, 
including Conant of Harvard, Wriston of Brown, Day of 
Cornell, Gates of the University of Pennsylvania, Dodds 
of Princeton, and Seymour of Yale. Also in this list of 
prestigious educators was the name of Isaiah Bowman, 
President of Johns Hopkins University (Duggan and Drury, 
1948).
In the report, the university presidents pledged to 
support all Jewish immigrant professors. Dr. Bowman's 
support of this document contrasts with an administrative 
style whose anti-semitic inclination accounted for 
Franck's willingness to leave his position at Johns 
Hopkins in order to seek a post elsewhere. In this 
instance, academic policy did not match academic reality
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(Duggan and Drury, 1948; Fermi, 1987; Jackman and Borden, 
1983) .
At the same time, Robert M. Hutchins, Chancellor of 
the University of Chicago, realized that the dismissals 
occurring in German universities offered him an 
unprecedented opportunity to enrich his faculty with 
superior professors (Kevles, 1978; Fermi, 1987). By 
extending invitations to exiled intellectuals to teach at 
the University of Chicago, he was able to "come out 
strongly for academic freedom and at the same time 
enlarge his staff with the most eminent men in Europe" 
(1987, 72). The exodus from German academia had resulted 
in an influx of disenfranchised, yet highly qualified 
professors into America. The idea of a professor's 
freedom to exercise his academic rights resulted in 
benefits both for the American university as well as for 
the immigrant professoriate (1978; 1987).
The college and university presidents involved 
consulted each other, exchanged copies of letters from 
Europe requesting positions, and feverishly sought 
wealthy individuals and foundations to find financial 
backing (Fermi, 1987). Hutchins wanted the University of 
Chicago to "bring at least four distinguished German 
scholars to the university for no less than three years" 
(1987, 72).
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Hutchins wrote to a prominent attorney expressing 
his need for someone to underwrite a new professorial 
chair in the physics department. After securing the 
endowment, Hutchins extended an invitation to James 
Franck to accept a position at the University of Chicago, 
in 1938. Franck accepted the position of professor of 
physical chemistry and continued his work through a 
research grant extended to the university by the Samuel 
Fels Foundation. Franck retained his professorship at 
the University of Chicago until 1947, when he retired as 
an emeritus (Fleming and Bailyn, 1969; Schlessinger and 
Schlessinger, 1986).
In spite of the shoddy way in which he was initially 
treated, Franck did not appear to be disillusioned about 
his life in his newly adopted homeland. He continued to 
believe that "while democracy might not be the perfect 
form of government and society, it was the best" (Kevles, 
1978, 282).
Otto Meyerhof in America
When Meyerhof left Germany in 1938, he came directly 
to America in hopes of finding a professorial position at 
a university. However, by this time, the attitude in the 
United States toward immigrant Jewish professors had 
worsened. This attitude was reflected in the lack of
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opportunities that Meyerhof had during his academic 
career in America. With the first Diaspora of Jewish 
intellectuals in the early 1930s, Americans were somewhat 
in sympathy with the needs of immigrant Jewish scientists 
because of the sudden persecutions of the Nazi regime.
By the latter part of the 1930s, however, the realities 
of the Depression and of the resultant focus upon self- 
preservation along with the anti-semitism inherent in the 
social concerns of the period had begun to make some 
Americans willing to limit the freedoms of the Jews 
(Fermi, 1987; Duggan and Drury, 1948).
Twice in 1938, national polls included the 
question, "Do you think the persecution of the Jews in 
Europe had been their own fault?" In both March and May 
of that year, an average of eleven percent of the 
respondents said that it was entirely the Jews fault; 
forty-nine percent stated that, in their opinion, the 
persecution of the Jews in Europe was partly their fault. 
Such findings indicated that a majority of Americans 
believed that the Jews in Europe "had it coming to them" 
(Weinberg, 1986, 220).
Additionally, the same March poll also asked, "Do 
you think Jews have too much power in the United States?" 
Forty-one percent of the respondents answered yes. 
Similarly, high percentages of the populace thought that
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Jews were "greedy, dishonest, and overly aggressive" 
(Weinberg, 1986, 220). Seven percent of the respondents 
even said that they would support an American campaign 
against the Jews (1986, 221). With such a large 
percentage of the American population now willing to 
openly express anti-semitic beliefs, coupled with the 
slow economic recovery from the devastation of the Great 
Depression, finding positions in American universities 
became more difficult for immigrant Jewish professors 
(Fermi, 1987; Nachmansohn, 1979; Weinberg, 1986).
The only offer Meyerhof received was for a 
directorship of a small laboratory within a commercial 
enterprise at an annual salary of $5,000 (Nachmansohn, 
1979). With this unsatisfactory option on the horizon, 
Meyerhof became quite disheartened, David Nachmansohn, a 
former colleague at the Kaiser Wilhelm Institute and a 
very close friend, suggested that he take a position in 
France. Nachmansohn knew that the French had a great 
admiration and appreciation for Meyerhof and his 
scientific research and that they would be quite willing 
to accept him (1979).
Meyerhof was very productive during his tenure at 
Institut de Biologie Physico-Chimique (Schlessinger and 
Schlessinger, 1986). In all likelihood, Meyerhof would 
have chosen to remain in Paris except for the outbreak of
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hostilities between Germany and France and the 
declaration of war that occurred just one year after his 
arrival. By May, 1940, Meyerhof determined that he would 
have to return to America (Nachmansohn, 1979).
His efforts to leave Paris, however, did not go 
smoothly. He and his family had to make a difficult and 
dangerous journey through France and Spain. With the 
spread of the war throughout Europe, escape grew 
increasingly difficult. Once again, with the German 
Army's impending occupation of Paris, Meyerhof found 
himself, as he had previously in Germany, in a place 
where the opportunity for him to teach and to research 
within an atmosphere of free inquiry was being eliminated 
by a narrow-minded political ideology (Duggan and Drury, 
1948; Kevles, 1978; Nachmansohn, 1979).
Meyerhof called upon his friend David Nachmansohn 
who, in the meantime, had accepted an invitation to join 
the faculty of Yale University. Nachmansohn contacted A. 
V. Hill, who was Meyerhof's long-time scientific 
colleague and personal friend, who in turn contacted A.
N. Richards, a professor at the University of 
Pennsylvania and the President of the National Academy of 
Sciences. Together they solicited the Emergency Relief 
Committee (ERC) to assist in Meyerhof's escape (Duggan 
and Drury, 1948; Nachmansohn, 1979; Weinberg, 1986)
151
The ERC, headed by Dr. Stephen P. Duggan, the 
founder and director of the Institute of International 
Education, had been developed through collaborative 
efforts with Dr. Alfred E. Cohn of the Rockefeller 
Institute of Medical Research. The Committee, which had 
functioned for twelve years in the United States 
providing assistance to foreign emigres, made funds 
available through grants-in-aid for salaries and research 
to colleges, universities and learned institutions. 
Between 1933 and 1939, the Committee, with the aid of 
Rockefeller Foundation matching grants, distributed about 
$1,000,000 in professorial stipends {Duggan and Drury, 
1948; Weinberg, 1986). Additionally, to counter-act 
anti-semitism, the ERC advocated an increasingly powerful 
moral argument as to the need to rescue these immigrant 
intellectuals. It raised funds by sponsoring concerts 
and charity affairs {Kevles, 1978) .
With the help of the Emergency Relief Committee, 
Meyerhof finally escaped to Spain and from there reached 
the United States in October, 1940. He was further 
assisted by the ERC when it partially funded a 
professorship created by Dr. Richards for Meyerhof at the 
University of Pennsylvania in the Department of 
Physiological Chemistry. The joint efforts of friends, 
colleagues, national organizations, and philanthropists
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proved to be adequate to the task of securing for 
Meyerhof the opportunity to pursue the truth, unhindered 
by the dreadful political forces spreading across Western 
Europe and the equally foreboding forces of anti-semitism 
that were now socially and politically overt in America 
(Duggan and Drury, 1948; Nachmansohn, 1979).
Upon arrival in Philadelphia, he once again built 
his laboratory. He began to share his methods and to 
enlighten his colleagues with his concepts. He inspired 
great admiration and affection among those within his 
department and they were much influenced by his ideas. 
Meyerhof was finally able once again to attain the level 
of research that had won him the Nobel Prize 
(Nachmansohn, 1979).
Otto Stern in America 
In 1933, the American Association of University 
Professors issued a public resolution that was 
transmitted to the Committee on Intellectual Cooperation 
of the League of Nations. It statied that the AAUP
has no wish to express any opinion on the political 
life or ideals of any nation, but science and 
scholarship long since have become international, 
and the conditions of intellectual life in every
153
important country are a matter of legitimate concern 
to every other (Fleming and Bailyn, 1969, 208).
The statement was intended as an expression of conviction 
and sympathy for "members of the profession who had been 
subjected to intolerant treatment in these difficult 
times" (1969, 208).
This aspect of intellectual internationalism, that 
circumstances that impact one intellectual impact all 
intellectuals, was a conviction held by Otto Stern. The 
idea of an international intellectual brotherhood of 
scientists continued to be part of his personal 
philosophy even after leaving Germany. Stern was 
convinced that all scholars had the right to pursue truth 
within their fields of study. To him, the protection of 
this right was essential, not only for the academic 
freedom of the individual scholar, but also as a means of 
furthering the intellectual freedom of the international 
academic community as a whole (Heathcote, 1953; Zuckerman 
1977; Davie, 1947).
Stern came to America in 1933 to accept a physics 
professorship at the Carnegie Institute of Technology in 
Pennsylvania. He had left Germany not merely because of 
the likelihood of his own persecution but also because 
the Nazi regime had begun to adversely affect the lives 
of his colleagues within the physics laboratory he
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directed. He further demonstrated his willingness to aid 
fellow scientists when he helped to arrange the escape 
from Germany of otto Frisch, a physicist at the 
University of Hamburg. Stern, through his association 
with the Academic Assistance Council, which was 
established in May, 1933, was also able to help Frisch 
secure a position as a physicist at P. M. S. Blackett's 
laboratory at Birkbeck College in London (Davie, 1947; 
Fleming and Bailyn, 1969).
Stern's involvement with the Academic Assistance 
Council (AAC) was b o m  out of his commitment to the ideal 
of an international intellectual brotherhood. The AAC, 
which had been established by Sir William Beveridge, an 
English economist, and Lord Ernest Rutherford, a dominant 
figure in English science, had been chartered "to defend 
the principle of academic freedom and to help those 
scholars and scientists of any nationality who, on 
grounds of religion or political opinion, were prevented 
from continuing their work in their own country" (Fleming 
and Bailyn, 1969, 211). The financial support for the 
Council came from English scholars who choose to 
contribute a percentage of their salary in order to 
create and support positions for exiled German 
intellectuals. For Stern, the AAC served as a platform 
from which he could assist exiled immigrants to secure
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academic positions. In Frisch's case, after service at 
the Blackett's laboratory, he was asked to accept a chair 
at the Bohr Institute for Theoretical Physics in 
Copenhagen, Denmark. To Otto Stern, the essence of his 
efforts in this area was, not only helping fellow 
scholars relocate, but ensuring that the academic 
environments to which they gravitated allowed them the 
opportunity to exercise the intellectual freedom that 
Stern believed was vital to useful academic activity 
(1969; Weber, 1980).
Stern's continued concern for his German colleagues 
as well as his work with organizations that assisted 
exiled intellectuals was further demonstrated by his 
identification with two groups that protested the Nazi 
denigration of science (Davie, 1947; Fleming and Bailyn, 
1969; Zuckerman, 1977).
In 1934, a group of distinguished European scholars 
in America issued a statement calling for scientists to 
condemn the limiting boundaries that political forces in 
Germany had placed around German science:
In that country the exact sciences have been openly 
degraded to jobbing for war industries. During the 
education of young physicists and chemists, much 
time is devoted to lectures and practical exercises 
in "defensive science": gas protection, air
156
protection, study of explosives, war intelligence 
service, which have no relation to the scientific 
significance (of their field]. Moreover, only 
such investigations are favored which are likely to 
bring about a direct technical advance (Fleming and 
Bailyn, 1969, 209).
These constraints, which were being imposed by Nazi 
policy, were placing limitations upon the professors' 
freedom to pursue their own research. Whereas science 
had been previously viewed as a means of enlightening the 
concepts of mankind and encouraging the pursuit of future 
knowledge, it was now being called upon to support the 
political agenda of the state. By forcing the 
replacement of scholarly intellectualism with the 
"science of armaments", a professor's research was no 
longer his own; instead, it had to be carried out within 
state-defined parameters. Out of a desire to stop such 
limitations upon professorial rights, Stern decided to 
embrace the tenets of this declaration.
In 1938, Stern joined another effort to challenge 
Nazi limitations upon the academic freedom of German 
professors. He supported the 1,284 signatories of a 
manifesto that challenged an article written by the Nazi 
Nobel Laureate, Johannes Stark. In his article, Stark 
denounced "theoretical physics, stressing the importance
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that, in German universities, applied research be pursued 
for technology, industry, economic self-sufficiency, and 
war production" (Wistrich, 1982, 297). The manifesto 
labeled Stark's article as
an attack on all theoretical physics, and by obvious 
implication, on scientific theory in general. It 
introduces the official racism of the Nazi's to 
divide physicists into good, that is, non- 
theoretical and Aryan, and bad, that is, theoretical 
and Jewish (Fleming and Bailyn, 1969, 209-210). 
Stern's agreement with the manifesto's position was 
largely predicated upon his belief that "any attack upon 
freedom of thought in one sphere, even as non-political a 
sphere as theoretical physics, is in effect an attack 
upon democracy itself" (1969, 210) . To allow a 
degradation of scholarly pursuit such as that being 
perpetrated by Stark and his colleagues in the Nazi 
Party, served only as a means to enslave the intellectual 
freedom of a people and therefore to disallow the 
unhindered pursuit of truth.
By the late 1930s, Stern was firmly established in 
the American academic community; he had held a position 
at the Carnegie Institute of Technology in Pennsylvania 
since 1933. He served there as a professor until 1945, 
when he retired as a professor emeritus. Two years
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before he retired, Stern won the Nobel Prize in Physics, 
largely due to the productive research which he was able 
to pursue at the Carnegie Institute. The fruitfulness of 
his research is appraised by fellow Nobelist, Max Born: 
Stern became a great physicist, as I had predicted. 
The method of molecular radiation which he 
introduced into atomic physics has become one of the 
main instruments of present-day research; his 
teaching has spread all over the world, and has 
produced numerous discoveries of the first rank as 
well as a significant number of Nobel Prize winners 
(Zuckerman, 1977, 25).
The lack of material available on Stern did not 
permit me to evaluate whether or not the limitations upon 
academic freedom in America, which were experienced by 
the other scientists in my study, were limitations that 
Stern also encountered. However, the direction and 
calibre of work that Otto Stern was able to produce in 
the United States would not have been possible under the 
requirements and constraints imposed upon scholars and 
scientists in Nazi Germany. Stern apparently found, in 
America, the intellectual liberty that permitted free and 
unhindered research (Fleming and Bailyn, 1969). He 
believed that every scholar had the right to work in an 
environment that would allow for the fullest expression
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of his talents without concern as to political agendas or 
geographical boundaries.
Summary
The events that impacted the careers of Albert 
Einstein, James Franck, Otto Meyerhof, and Otto Stern 
were focused on an academic realm that was nestled within 
an arena of political turmoil. Academic freedom was the 
singular element upon which the fruitfulness of their 
careers balanced. It was the setting askew of this 
balance that caused these elite scientists to re-examine 
their lives, their careers, and their professions and to 
take steps to once again see that balance restored.
They each had made the decision to leave their 
homeland because those things that had been held dear 
were being trampled by Nazi boots. Likewise, they hoped 
to rediscover those same precious elements in a foreign 
land. The journey was for each of these professors the 
same crucial, yet brave quest that is occasionally 
necessary for men who desire to continue to "breathe 
free."
On one hand, there was the German state--controlled 
by the Nazi agenda for a pure Aryan race using a pure 
Aryan science that stilled the heart of true research and 
true teaching. To surrender to such an agenda would have
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been to acquiesce to the sheer impossibility of academic 
freedom existing while bound by the chains of academic 
slavery.
On the other hand, there was the United States-- 
where there existed a conflict between the prerogatives 
of the academic and the fears of the populace. As a 
mortal import, the emigrant arrived on the same barge as 
did economic chaos, communism, and xenophobia. These 
elements were as real a threat to academic freedom as was 
the propaganda of the Nazi regime.
In America, the door had been opened upon a field 
where the battle for equality remained to be fought. The 
arena was different; yet, the foe was essentially the 
same--the belief that the demands of the many should take 
precedence over the rights of the few. These four 
immigrant scholars faced this new challenge and took up 
the gauntlet of academic freedom.
CHAPTER 7 
CONCLUSION
Introduction
The nature and development of academic freedom has 
been formed and directed by the constructs of and the 
constraints upon intellectual liberty. When academic 
freedom's structural and theoretical tenets, which are a 
product of time and place, are challenged by those 
elements that seek to manipulate truth, forces come into 
play. The forces of universally-applicable and 
educationally-specific constructs and constraints (see 
Figure 1) constitute the politically-driven conventions 
that define academic freedom. The ensuing dynamic 
interaction between ideological lines either nullifies or 
solidifies the intellectual liberty of scholars. The 
examination and evaluation of such interactions has led 
me to conclude that the politically-determined 
conventions of academic freedom have both positively and 
negatively influenced the careers of four particular 
scientists.
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CONSTRUCTS
162
UNIVERSALLY-APPLICABLE
Principles of Acceptable 
Knowledge
Access to Acceptable 
Knowledge
Principle of Authority
The Right of
Ideological
Dissemination
Innate Heterogeneity 
of the Human Experience
EDUCATIONALLY-SPECIFIC
>>> Lehrfreiheit 
> »  Lernfreiheit
>>> Academic Self-Governance
>>> Extra- and Intra- 
Mural Utterance
>>> Individualism
CONSTRAINTS
UNIVERSALLY-APPLICABLE EDUCATIONALLY-SPECIFIC
Institutionalization 
of Current Societal 
Norms
Ideology of Resource 
Distribution
Social Definitions of 
Acceptability
Agenda Advancement 
Through Ideological 
Consolidation
> »  Governmental,
Bureaucratic, and 
Legislative Power
> »  Financial Constraints 
>>> Scapegoating 
» >  Nationalism
Figure 1. Universal constructs and constraints upon the 
endeavors of mankind and their devolved conceptual 
representation in the educational arena.
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The heart of academic freedom, as indicated by 
Searle (1975), is the right, without interference, to 
teach, to conduct research, and to publish the findings 
of that research. This principle operates from two 
perspectives: the first represents a special,
institutionally-specific basis and the second is a 
general, universal foundation. My study indicates that 
the "special" basis for the implementation of academic 
freedom is that which is found within the university and 
is exemplified by the interaction between the 
professoriate and other internal entities. The "general" 
basis is an understanding that, as free individuals, 
professors should be able to share their professional 
viewpoints, uninhibited by forces outside the university. 
I conclude that both the internal and external elements 
of Searle's principle must function simultaneously in 
order for intellectual liberty to be maintained.
The combination of these elements of academic 
freedom is affected by what Fuchs (1963) emphasizes as 
the development of intellectual liberty through both 
evolutionary and environmental processes. These two 
components work hand-in-hand within the university and 
society in establishing academic freedom. The changes 
that occur in the historical development of intellectual
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liberty within the German and American professoriate and 
within the careers of four elite immigrant scientists 
reflect the interplay between evolutionary constructs and 
environmental constraints.
Germany
When Humboldt, in 1810, attempted to lessen the 
state's control over the University of Berlin by 
establishing a model of academic freedom, he did so based 
upon three constructs: Lehrfreiheit. the freedom of
teaching and research; Lernfreiheit. the freedom of 
learning; and academic self-government (Rodes, 1964; 
Maurois, 1966). While Humboldt was stressing the need to 
separate the monarchy and the university so that higher 
education might prosper, the bureaucracy was working to 
increase state control by use of the constraints of 
selecting appointees and of requiring that the university 
and its professors support the state's agenda (Gay, 1968; 
Beyerchen, 1977).
As nationalism invaded the political conscience of 
the German nation during the mid-1800s, an increasing 
desire for academic freedom moved some members of the 
professoriate to exercise their right to greater 
intellectual liberty. Professor Ernst Arndt supported 
students' rights to protest even though the protests had
165
been labeled "revolutionary" by the state. Arndt's 
subsequent arrest by state officials was protested by his 
fellow professors as an arbitrary limitation to 
Humboldt's construct of Lehrfreiheit. The Prussian 
government's use of power to prevent both students and 
professors from expressing their intellectual liberty by 
challenging state authority was a constraint in 
opposition to the construct of individualism, paramount 
in the nationalistic philosophy (Kandel, 1935; Lilge,
1975).
With Professor Leo Arons, the Prussian government 
wanted the University of Berlin to revoke his veni 
legendi because Arons' political views did not align with 
those of the government; however, the faculty senate 
refused to sanction Arons. In response, the government 
passed legislation in 1899 prohibiting professors with 
unacceptable political beliefs from teaching at royal 
universities. The construct of academic self-governance 
as exercised by the faculty senate was flagrantly 
constrained by the legislative power of the government 
embodied in the passage of "lex Arons" (Samuel and 
Thomas, 1971; Craig, 1978).
The Weimar Republic, established in 1919, was unable 
to eliminate the nationalism that was becoming more and 
more characteristic of the "German" mind. As a means of
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constraint, the government had historically used its 
financial resources to keep the allegiance of the 
professoriate. With the World War I reparations 
stipulated by the Treaty of Versailles, the Weimar 
Republic did not have the fiscal assets to maintain the 
professoriate's pre-World War I funding level. The 
impact of this deficit upon the faculty was manifested in 
a lowering of their prestige within society and a 
struggle for professorial security. The professors 
feared that reduced finances would create a reduced 
number of faculty positions. This led the faculty to 
look for a scapegoat responsible for their lowered 
prestige and lack of security {Hasluck, 1938; Kelly,
1972).
Some of the professors believed that their Jewish 
colleagues generally held internationalistic philosophies 
because many Jews had positions in the internationally- 
focused Weimar Republic. This belief, coupled with 
current professorial woes, provided the fuel necessary 
for anti-semitic sentiments to flourish (Kelly, 1972). 
Many of the professors ascribed their financial distress 
to the Jewish members of the Weimar bureaucracy. They 
did not want to accept that their support for Germany's 
pre-World War I nationalism had (1) led to a war that was 
concluded by a treaty that financially crippled the
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nation; (2) brought about the establishment of the Weimar 
Republic; and (3) led to the professors' reduced 
circumstances. As Allport (1983) indicates, when fear 
and anxiety over real or imagined danger threatens an 
individual's security, people will often seek out an 
individual or group to blame. In most cases, as in this 
case, "scapegoating" is either partly or wholly 
unfounded.
When the Jewish professor, Hans Nawiasky, of the 
University of Munich, spoke out in favor of the legal 
validity of the Treaty of Versailles, his professorial 
liberty was restricted. When his position was challenged 
by angry students, his colleagues did not uphold 
Nawiasky's right to comment on controversial political 
issues. Many members of the professoriate disapproved 
of the Treaty and of those Jews they felt were 
sympathetic with it. Their disapproval was based on the 
belief that the Treaty's stipulations were the root 
causes of their financial distress. The faculty had 
chosen to limit one of its own member's access to the 
construct of Lehrfreiheit (Gay, 1968; Grunberger, 1971)- 
A scapegoat had been found in the person of Hans Nawiasky 
and the faculty's anger over the present political 
environment led them to use the constraint of sanctioning
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as a means of curtailing a colleague's classroom 
expression (Allport, 1958; Ringer, 1969).
Humboldt's principles of academic freedom were 
violated when, prior to World War II, some of the German 
professoriate began to view Jewish scapegoating as 
acceptable within the philosophy of the National 
Socialist Party. As Beyerchen (1977) indicates, many of 
these National Socialist professors began to believe that 
the state and the faculty should work together in a 
spirit of nationalism. This nationalistic philosophy 
contended that the Jew represented a despised intrusion 
into the Teutonic background and the historical 
foundations of German culture. National socialism 
practiced discrimination by exclusion. As scapegoats, 
Jewish professors were isolated as a repugnant threat to 
the nationalistic goals of the university and the Party 
and, by extension, the government. The attack was not 
merely upon the person of the Jewish professor. As 
Allport (1958) conceptualized, the attack took the form 
of labeling a discredited group to which all connections 
must be severed. Thus, the elimination of non-Aryan 
thought throughout German society was manifested through 
Jewish professors being fired, their books being burned, 
and their teachings being labeled as "un-German." This 
three-fold approach used by the Nazis was an effective
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constraint in that it delimited academic freedom in 
Germany. Humboldt's constructs of Lehrfreiheit.
Lernfreiheit. and academic self-governance deteriorated 
when both the faculty and the state used discrimination 
and scapegoating as constraints (Kneller, 1941; Bentwich, 
1953).
A  systematic program of increasing state control 
concluded with the Nazis determining who taught, who 
administrated, who learned, and what was taught. The 
interaction between the evolutionary constructs and the 
environmental constraints of German academic freedom 
resulted in the phenomena of scapegoating, where the 
weaker social group is abused verbally or physically by 
the stronger body politic (Allport, 19 83). The 
interaction equally devastated Humboldt's idea of 
academic freedom and destroyed the intellectual liberty 
of the German professoriate.
America
The development of academic freedom in America 
during the 1700s was marked by the development of several 
forces, such as the combined constraints of the power and 
influence of the American aristocracy. This group, 
comprised of members of the ecclesiastical, political, 
and collegiate arenas, used their financial power at
170
times to constrain professorial intellectual liberty- 
Often, these benefactors used their financial influence 
to muzzle faculty members who held viewpoints that 
conflicted with theirs. Academic freedom was limited as 
college presidents and governing boards were willing to 
acquiesce to the demands of those who held the purse 
strings (Hofstadter and Metzger, 1955; French, 1964; 
Portman, 1972).
With the move into the 1800s, classically-based 
curriculum was being augmented by newly-established 
professional schools, such as law and medicine. This 
utilitarian emphasis required a professor whose expertise 
was based upon his specialized knowledge in the 
professional disciplines. Utilitarian education also 
required increased funding from state sources because it 
involved both curriculum expansion and increased faculty. 
With the dependence upon the government for more 
financial resources, governing boards attempted to 
curtail professorial freedoms so that there would be no 
conflict between the agenda of the university and that of 
their financial benefactor, the states. These attempts 
took the form of limits upon the construct of faculty 
authority over the development of the curriculum. The 
restraint to the university's deliberate act of 
undermining professorial rights was professorial
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expertise. Because of the uniqueness of the faculty's 
specialized knowledge, they were in a position to cause 
governing boards and states to capitulate to their 
demands to retain control over the curriculum (French, 
1964; Herbst, 1965).
With the onset of the Civil War, slavery became the 
issue upon which professorial freedom to pursue and teach 
the truth was questioned. The politically-motivated 
construct of ideological bias, based upon how the North 
and the South saw the necessity of slavery, became an 
issue of debate within the university setting.
Professorial opinions, whether for or against the black 
man's freedom, could be interpreted as a direct attack 
against the "national-view" of either the North or the 
South. To hold controversial views, particularly ones as 
volatile as those incumbent to the slavery issue, could 
result in a professor's dismissal. States and their 
universities were willing to use their administrative 
authority as a constraint to ensure a professor's 
allegiance (Hofstadter and Metzger, 1955; Veysey, 1965).
American students, throughout the latter part of the 
1800s, began to travel to Germany in search of a higher 
level of scholarship than that which was available to 
them in American colleges. While there, they observed 
the intellectual liberty enjoyed by German professors and
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students. This liberty was the result of the application 
of the constructs of Lernfreiheit. Lehrfreiheit. and 
academic self-governance. Inspired by their experience, 
they desired to transplant these constructs of the German 
model of academic freedom into American colleges and 
universities. At the turn of the century, the paramount 
concern of many of the returning scholars was to improve 
scholarship and instruction in the United States. This 
coincided with the struggle of some professors to 
implement and define, within the system of higher 
education in the United States, not only the constructs 
of Humboldt's model of academic freedom, but also the 
uniquely American concept of the constructs of intra- and 
extra-mural utterance (Thwing, 1928; Rudolph, 1962).
In 1900, Professor Edward A. Ross of Stanford spoke 
out publicly against some of the business practices that 
had proved successful for Mr. Leland Stanford, the 
founder of Stanford University. At that time, the 
financial resources upon which the university rested had 
been placed, not with a board of trustees, but solely in 
the hands of Mr. Stanford's widow. Highly offended by 
Professor Ross' comments, she demanded and eventually 
secured his dismissal. Through the economic clout of 
Stanford's "one-woman" governing board, constraints had 
been placed upon the construct of extra-mural utterance.
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Professor Ross' dismissal, coupled with the growing 
desire for the guarantee of extra-mural utterance, led 
some members of America's professoriate to establish an 
organization where their demands for academic freedom 
could be addressed (Hofstadter and Metzger, 1955; 
Brubacher and Rudy, 1958).
The American Association of University professors 
(AAUP) was formed in part to ensure the proper exercise 
of the constraint of lay-board authority over the 
university. Judge Ogden L. Mills, a distinguished jurist 
and Harvard graduate, indicated that professorial views 
might not always coincide with those of governing boards, 
but that a greater disservice would be done to society if 
the voice of the professoriate to search for and speak 
the truth were restricted (Alberty and Bode, 1938). The 
1915 Declaration of Principles of the AAUP laid a 
foundation that served to strengthen this concept. By 
asserting that constraints against the freedom of 
professors to pursue, to teach, and to share truth should 
be discarded, students would be able to critically assess 
new ideas and determine their validity (Declaration,
1915). The construct of faculty intra- and extra-mural 
utterance embodied in the AAUP proclamation was 
challenged when America became involved in World War I.
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At the height of America's participation in the war, 
a debate arose as to whether or not national security was 
threatened by a professor's right to academic freedom.
The state governments desired to use legislative 
authority as a constraint against such liberty.
Professors believed that national security could only be 
maintained through a free exercise of the constructs of 
intra- and extra-mural utterance (Bentwich, 1953) . The 
AAUP responded to such legislative restraints with a 
statement that allowed the limitation of professorial 
rights, within a wartime setting, as long as those 
restrictions were commensurate with those enjoined upon 
all citizens (Report, 1918).
Constraints against academic freedom surfaced during 
the 1930s as a result of the "Red Scare," an hysterical 
fear of many Americans that European communism would 
replace American capitalism and that the ideals of the 
American dream were being supplanted by foreign-born 
immigrants (Fermi, 1987; Kleves, 1987). The "Scare" was 
countered by state legislatures that instituted teacher 
loyalty oaths. Under this legislation, professors, 
because they were viewed as having considerable influence 
over the minds of America's youth, were required to 
declare their allegiance to state and national 
constitutions and to acknowledge their support of
175
American nationalism. This action was seen by many 
faculties and universities as a constraint to a 
professor's fundamental right to express and evaluate the 
controversial issues of society. The AAUP and the 
American Association of Colleges, in their combined 
strength began, in 1934, to work on their "Statement of 
Principles and Interpretative Comments on Academic 
Freedom and Tenure" in opposition to such legislation.
As a result of their continued efforts, the constraint of 
teacher oath laws gradually faded (Alberty and Bode,
1938; Knight and Hall, 1951).
During the 1930s, the Great Depression brought about 
a plummeting of governmental financial support for higher 
education; with fewer resources, faculty job security 
lessened. When both state and federal legislatures 
slashed fiscal appropriations, universities had to cut 
back programs and limit faculty hiring. This financial 
reality acted as a constraint upon the construct of 
faculty self-governance in the hiring process. Whereas 
professors would normally be hired based upon their 
qualifications, fiscal concerns led to the consideration 
of other factors (Kevles, 1978; Perry, 1984).
An additional consideration that occasionally kept 
professorial expertise from being relied upon as one of 
the paramount qualifications for hiring was the
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constraint of authority used by hiring committees upon 
the construct of academic self-governance. Many faculty 
recruitment processes in colleges and universities across 
the country yielded to citizen pressure to give 
preference to "native-born" applicants rather than to 
immigrants, particularly Jews (Fleming and Bailyn, 1969; 
Clark, 1984). When some universities hired new faculty, 
they relied upon the constraint of "tabloid thinking." 
This form of scapegoating occurs when an individual or 
group simplifies an issue in order to facilitate finding 
an acceptable solution to a social dilemma (Allport,
1983). During this time of fiscal scarcity, some hiring 
committees, in adopting this form of scapegoating, 
simplified their social dilemma of having to find 
positions for "native-born" American applicants by 
ignoring the applications of many highly qualified Jewish 
immigrants who were seeking faculty positions (1983;
Fermi, 1987).
Intellectual liberty in America was largely 
established and maintained by the AAUP through its 
issuance of resolutions that formed a codified foundation 
for academic freedom, upholding the constructs of 
Lehrfreiheit. academic self-governance, and intra- and 
extra-mural utterance. This was done in the face of 
constraints such as governmental power being used to
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restrict professorial rights during wartime, limitations 
to free speech being applied in the form of teacher oath 
laws, and scapegoating. The dynamic interplay between 
these prevailing forces served as a catalyst for the 
development of academic freedom in America.
The Four Intellectuals
In this case study, I have examined the lives of 
four exiled intellectuals. Their experiences with 
academic freedom hinged upon several elements. One such 
element was their Jewish heritage. With the passage of 
the Civil Service Laws in Germany during the 1930s, the 
Jew was relegated to an inferior position relative to 
that of individuals of pure Aryan heritage (Tal, 1982).
In like manner, anti-semitism was evident in America when 
popular polls indicated that a majority of Americans 
considered Jews to be "greedy, dishonest, and overly 
aggressive" (Weinberg, 1986, 220). The question being 
asked is "Why is prejudice aimed at the Jew?" The answer 
to this question established the constraints upon the 
academic freedom of four particular elite scientists.
As Allport . (1958) indicates, groups rather than 
individuals are often chosen as objects of hate and 
aggression. The reason for this choice is that one human 
being is, after all, fairly similar to another. To
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attack an individual would be to arouse some pain within 
ourselves. Groups, however, are more abstract and 
impersonal, particularly if either a visible or corporate 
distinguishing characteristic is identifiable for such a 
group. Group characteristics may include skin color or a 
particular cultural heritage.
Additionally, people hold prejudices against groups 
because they find it unnecessary to test unfavorable 
stereotypes against reality. A stereotypical expression, 
such as all Jews have big noses, does not require proof 
for the prejudiced group to believe the statement (Fromm, 
1947). In group scapegoating, "character-conditioned" 
(1947, 214) hatred surfaces. This hatred arises from a 
continued readiness to hate based upon a perceived, 
whether real or not, danger from the hated group (1947).
In my study, the elements of this hatred have acted as 
constraints upon Jews and particularly upon the academic 
freedom of Jewish professors.
Jews were hated by the Aryans in Germany. Aryans 
feared that Jewish internationalist views threatened the 
nationalistic demand for support of all things German.
Jews were hated by "white, Anglo-saxon Protestants"
(WASPS) in America for their international views because 
of the fear that those views were closely aligned with 
communism. The four scientists in my case study saw
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themselves presenting scientific knowledge as a means of 
bettering the lives of every citizen in the world. Their 
knowledge, their expertise, their inquiry, and their 
findings were dedicated to universal good, not for 
partisan or nationalistic honor (Hasluck, 1938; Fromm, 
1947; Fermi, 1968).
In Germany, as Einstein's intellectual liberty was 
challenged due to the constraint of nationalism, the Nazi 
party chose to use their power to dismiss him as a 
constraint against his internationalist philosophy. 
Likewise, upon receipt of the news of his intended move 
to America, individuals such as Mrs. Randolph 
Frothingham, President of the Woman Patriotic 
Corporation, used protest as a constraint against the 
dissemination, in America, of Einstein's 
internationalist, and perceived communist beliefs. In 
Germany, Einstein resisted the constraints by resigning 
his position before he could be dismissed. In America, 
his professional power and personal influence, due to the 
country's need for his intellectual advancements, 
superseded the Woman Patriotic Corporation's political 
influence. In some cases, such as Einstein's, despite 
group scapegoating, personal characteristics outweigh 
group characterizations, which allow for a tolerant
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response from the "scapegoaters" (Allport, 1958; Clark,
1984) .
The Jew was also hated in Germany for his non-Aryan 
heritage because of the fear that his "Jewishness" would 
pollute the "pure Aryan" ideal. Likewise, in the United 
States, he was hated for his "non-American" heritage 
because of an irrational fear of foreigners. These fears 
served to color the perspective held by some individuals 
in Germany and in America as to the theoretical approach 
of some Jewish scientists. The Nazis felt that this 
theoretical approach was one that gave science a "Jewish" 
perspective rather than a practical nationalistic or 
Aryan one. The Jewish view of scientific research did 
not rest easy on the minds of certain Americans who felt 
that the world was being fooled by a "foreigner's" 
revision of the natural order of things (Kneller, 1941; 
Fromm, 1947; Jackman and Borden, 1983; Sayen, 1985).
Franck had determined to remain within Nazi Germany 
as long as his Jewish colleagues were not restrained.
When the Nazis used their political power as a constraint 
against the Jew, Franck resigned his position and left 
Germany. Under President Isaiah Bowman of Johns Hopkins 
University, Franck once again found that, because of his 
Jewish heritage, he was limited by the constraint of 
administrative power. In these situations, the
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constraint of either political or administrative power 
was used as a means of discrimination because a 
particular individual belonged to a scapegoated group 
(Duggan and Drury, 1948; Kelly, 1972; Allport, 1983;
Gallin, 1986).
The Jew was hated by some of the citizenry of the 
Weimar Republic. They feared that the Jews' position 
within the bureaucracy would ensure the employment of 
Jews rather than "pure Germans" in the limited 
governmental positions available within a depressed 
economy. The Jew was hated by Americans for his mere 
presence because of their fear that his gaining 
employment would fill the limited number of positions 
that "native-born" Americans were seeking in Depression 
America. The Jews' affiliation with the Weimar Republic 
and their labeling as "foreigners" positioned them as 
scapegoats for the anxieties inherent in financially 
depressed economies (Fromm, 1947; Perry, 1984; Gallin, 
1986).
In Germany, the alignment of the four scientists in 
my study with the Weimar Republic's support for the 
Treaty of Versailles resulted in their being seen by some 
of their colleagues as partly responsible for the 
financial distress caused by the Treaty. In America, 
their selection for professorial positions that could
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have been filled by "native-born" Americans caused them 
to be linked to the financial problems associated with 
the limited number of employment possibilities for 
Americans during the Depression. Therefore, these Jewish 
professors' exercise of Lehrfreiheit. as a construct that 
provided academic freedom, was limited by the constraint 
of public opinion (Hasluck, 1938; Gallin, 1986).
In both Germany and America, the public's fear of 
economic failure fueled anti-semitism. As an individual, 
Stern countered this constraint by assisting other 
individual immigrant professors in finding faculty 
positions where the construct of academic freedom was not 
limited by anti-semitism. In the case of each of the 
scientists in my study, they were able, through their 
individual skills, knowledge, and abilities, to 
circumvent the scapegoating against their "Jewish" group 
and to garner support from certain collegiate spheres of 
influence in order to find freedom rather than suffer 
under discrimination in their academic pursuits. These 
four scientists faced the constraint of a xenophobic and 
ethnocentric public through an ability to override social 
discrimination in their attempts to find professorial 
positions, whether at home or abroad, where the 
constructs of academic freedom prevailed (Lilge, 1975; 
Perry, 1984).
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The foundation for their campaign for academic 
freedom can be seen in Wilhelm von Humboldt's writings of 
over a century ago:
It is not that the State ought to teach respect for 
the Jews. What it ought to do is to eradicate the 
inhumane and prejudiced mentality that judges a 
human being not by his specific qualities but by his 
descent and religion, and treats him not as an 
individual but as a member of a group with which he 
is considered to share certain characteristics of 
necessity. This the State can only do by saying 
loud and clear that it no longer recognizes any 
differences...(Weinberg, 1986, 89).
Recommendat ions 
The major recommendations that can be drawn from my 
case study revolve around three distinct concepts; those 
of the universities, the faculties, and academic freedom. 
The interplay between these three entities created the 
stage upon which the intellectual liberty of scholars 
rests. Examining the relationship among these three 
yields the following recommendations.
Although much research is available with reference 
to the historical evolution of academic freedom and the 
history of both the German and American universities,
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scholars have neglected the impact of the politically- 
determined conventions of academic freedom on the careers 
of particular faculty members. The relationship between 
the political state and the university is evident.
However, the converse effect between the politically- 
determined evolution of the university and of its impact 
upon faculty members has not been explored in depth.
Even in the research on Einstein, Franck, Meyerhof, and 
Stern, where one would anticipate an interest based upon 
the consequences of such conventions, the main aspect-- 
the Jewish question--was the only political emphasis on 
which substantial information was available.
My research on the careers of these men was hampered 
by a lack of primary sources on Franck, Meyerhof, and 
Stern and secondary sources on Stern. Particularly 
lacking were biographies on and autobiographies by 
Franck, Meyerhof, and Stern. Additionally, in the case 
of Stern, connections were not made within the available 
literature indicating his involvement in many of the 
situations with which his colleagues had to deal.
Research focusing into Stern's tenure at the Carnegie 
Institute of Technology might reveal more about 
conditions he experienced relative to academic freedom.
Additional research should tackle the effect of 
"private governments" (McWilliams, 1948) or various
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governing bodies, upon the academic freedom of the Jewish 
professoriate. Just as Henry Ford affected the thoughts 
of citizens through his anti-semitism, so others, whose 
power and influence remain outside the university walls, 
can influence its internal and external academic liberty. 
Although Hofstadter and Metzger (1955) have researched 
the impact of big-business philanthropy upon higher 
education, it would be of particular value to look more 
closely at the impact that such private philanthropies 
have had upon the constraint of anti-semitism.
As in the case of Isaiah Bowman, university 
presidents can and do affect academic careers. Studying 
the degree and manner of influence by which university 
presidents may have altered the careers of faculty would 
provide insight into how the constructs of academic 
freedom serve as restraints to administrative authority.
Contemporary aspects of academic freedom are seen in 
the case of the Afrocentrist Leonard Jeffries at CUNY, 
the bills to abolish tenure before the South Carolina 
legislature, and faculty members taking institutions to 
court over tenure issues at Regent University in 
Virginia. Further study is recommended in order to 
examine the effects of current time-frames and social 
concerns upon intellectual liberty.
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Academic freedom is a product of time and place. It 
is also a result of particular constructs and 
constraints. Politically-driven conventions remain one 
of the catalysts that affect the intellectual liberty 
experienced by scholars and students as they continue to 
seek for truth within a climate of change.
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